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The Dangers of Deference:
International Claim Settlement by the President

Ingrid Brunk Wuerth*

During the final months of the Clinton administration, the State Department entered into a trio of unprecedented international agreements with
2
France (the "French Agreement"),' Germany (the "German Agreement"),
3
and Austria (the "Austrian Agreement"). These "sole" executive agreements, designed to resolve litigation pending in the U.S. courts that arose
out of World War II and the Holocaust, were made without Senate ratification (as required for a treaty) 4 or congressional authorization (as in a congressional-executive agreement). 5 Although executive branch settlement of
claims without Senate or congressional approval has a long history,6 these
executive agreements mark an important departure from prior practice by
resolving pending U.S. litigation against private companies rather than
claims against foreign sovereigns. 7 As one senior State Department official
noted, the German Agreement was a "move into uncharted areas.""
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago;
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For comments on earlier drafts, many thanks to Curtis
Bradley, William R. Casto, Jack Chin, Donna Nagy, Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Wendy Parker, Peter
Spiro, Suja Thomas, and Michael Van Alstine. Errors and omissions are mine alone. For excellent research
assistance I am indebted to Lisel Holdenried, Elizabeth Lenhart, LaToya Rembert, and Philip E. Wells.
1. AGREEMENT CONCERNING PAYMENTS FOR CERTAIN LOSSES SUFFERED DURING WORLD WAR II,
U.S.-Fr., Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-36, 2001 WL 416465 [hereinafter FRENCH AGREEMENT].
2.

AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE FOUNDATION

"REMEMBRANCE,

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE Fu-

TURE," U.S.-ER.G., July 17, 2000, Temp. State Dep't No. 00-129, 2000 WL 1863131 [hereinafter
GERMAN AGREEMENT).
3. AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE AUSTRIAN FUND "RECONCILIATION, PEACE AND COOPERATION,"

U.S.-Aus., Oct. 24, 2000, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-13, 2000 WL 33125445 [hereinafter AUSTRIAN
AGREEMENT]; AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER

24, 2000 CONCERNING THE

AUSTRIAN FUND "RECONCILIATION, PEACE AND COOPERATION" (RECONCILIATION FUND), U.S.-Aus.,

Jan. 23, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-73, 2001 WL 935261.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
5. Sole executive agreements are concluded without congressional authorization. Congressionalexecutive agreements receive approval by Congress, either ex ante or ex post, but are not ratified by twothirds of the Senators present, as is required for treaties.
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.
7. Ronald Bettauer, Deputy Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State, termed the German
Agreement "unprecedented." Ronald Bettauer, Keynote Address: The Role of the United States Government in
Recent Holocaust Claims Resolution, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2002).
8. Id. at 2. Bettauer describes the German Agreement as an "unconventional and unprecedented arrangement" that "involved an executive agreement between the United States and Germany, but not a
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The agreements do not, however, purport to terminate the litigation of
their own force, but instead obligate the State Department to file "Statements of Interest" requesting that courts dismiss the cases based on the foreign policy interests of the United States. 9 Courts have already done so, even
over the objections of plaintiffs, 10 without so much as a nod either to the
important expansion of executive authority at work or to the Treaty" and
Supremacy 12 Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.13
Although the Executive often seeks-and receives-deference from the
courts, 14 these Statements of Interest are particularly troubling for three reasons. First, they are made pursuant to executive agreements. Because the
Supremacy Clause makes "Treaties," but not other international agreements,
the "supreme Law of the Land,"'15 the courts' deference to these executive
agreements permits the Executive to achieve through the courts what it
could not otherwise do without the agreement of two-thirds of the Senate, as
required by a treaty.
Thus, the executive agreement with Germany resulted in the involuntary
dismissal of a case brought by a resident of California pursuant to California
state law.16 Although some courts dismissed Holocaust and World War II-

claims settlement agreement." Id.at 6. He also points out that the German Agreement "involved dismissals of class
action lawsuits, but no class action settlement." Id.
9. The Austrian Agreement provides, for example, that the "United States will recommend dismissal
on any valid legal ground which, under the United States system of jurisprudence, will be for the United
States courts to determine." AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, annex B. The United States "does not
suggest that its policy interests concerning the Fund in themselves provide an independent legal basis for
dismissal, but will reinforce the point that U.S. policy interests favor dismissal on any valid legal
ground." Id. The French and German Agreements include similar language. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra
note 1, annex C; GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex B.
10. See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 371
(D.NJ. 2001) [hereinafter Nazi Era Cases]. The court had already granted a motion for voluntary dismissal brought by plaintiffs who wanted to pursue claims with the "Remembrance, Responsibility and
the Future" Foundation (the "German Foundation") established pursuant to the German Agreement. In re
Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000). The Second Circuit
has also considered a Statement of Interest in a case involving claims against German and Austrian banks;
in that case, too, the plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal. The district court eventually granted the
motion, the defendants appealed some language in the order, and the Second Circuit granted mandamus
relief. In re Austrian, German Holocaust Litig., 250 F3d 156, 159 (2d Cit. 2001). Two other courts
dismissed slave labor claims against private corporations before the United States and Germany formalized their agreement. These decisions were based in part on the negotiations, which were already underway, and on the courts' conclusions that resolution of such claims was a matter for the political branches.
Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 281-85 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 E Supp. 2d 424, 483-90 (D.N.J. 1999). See discussion infra Part V.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.
2.
13. See cases cited supra note 10.
14. Indeed, some of the World War Il-related litigation was dismissed even prior to the conclusion of
the executive agreements. See supra note 10. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.649 (2000).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.
2. See infra Part II.
16. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F Supp. 2d at 372. The case was brought in California state court but removed. Id. at 372-73.
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3

related litigation before the conclusion of the executive agreements, 7 others
did not.' 8 After the agreements, however, executive requests for deference
come backed-in the German case, for example-by the knowledge that a
$4.3 billion international agreement cannot go forward without a dismissal
of the litigation by the courts. 19 Although not formally bound by the
agreements, courts have relied in part upon the agreements themselves to
dismiss the litigation. 20 This use of an executive agreement means that
causes of action created by state law and litigated between private parties are
effectively preempted by the Executive acting with the acquiescence of the
courts through the Statements of Interest, but without the participation of
Congress through the formal operation of the Supremacy Clause.
Second, in the area of foreign affairs, prior practice by the executive
branch is itself one measure of constitutionality. 21 In other words, the courts'
deference in this area helps to entrench the practice as a matter of constitutional law. Dismissing the litigation pursuant to an executive agreement
strengthens the argument that the Executive is entitled to such deference in
subsequent cases that involve such agreements. The deference-based doctrines that the courts have used to evaluate the Statements of Interest completely fail, however, to appreciate this significance.
Finally, and related to the second concern, these executive agreements
serve as an attractive future model for the State Department to resolve other
private litigation with foreign affairs implications. Indeed, a State Department official has already suggested that the German Agreement may serve as
a precedent for the resolution of "private litigation in U.S. courts," where

17. See Burger-Fischer,65 E Supp. 2d at 285; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
18. See, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F Supp. 2d 117, 138 (E.D.N.Y 2000). This litigation was
explicitly included in the FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, annex A.
19. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 379 n.18, 383.
20. Id. at 383. The court reasoned, for example, that
[the] Executive Agreement is a pronouncement by our government that claims against German Industry should not be litigated, but instead should be submitted to the [German) Foundation. That
commitment, made in an international agreement, has been relied on by both the German government and German Industry in providing more than $4 Billion to the [German] Foundation, which
they reasonably expect will be the only vehicle for providing compensation to victims. That pronouncement has also been relied on by many victims around the world, who have already consented
to dismissal of their actions in this Court and others.
Id. Although the government could have filed a Statement of Interest and the court could have dismissed
the litigation even without an executive agreement, the agreement itself is integral to the court's reasoning, as the quote above makes clear. Moreover, the court's analysis rests on the existence of the German
Foundation and the Statement of Interest. Politically it appears that an agreement was necessary before the
German government would create the Foundation and the U.S. government would file the Statements of
Interest. Id. at 379; see also infra note 67. As the court notes several times, the government could have
used a treaty (or an executive order) instead of the Statements of Interest, but relied instead upon judicially created deference doctrines. Id. at 382, 386-87.
21. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 657 (1981). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (looking to historical practice to
evaluate the constituionality of the President's seizure of the steel mills); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?:
The Constitutionalityof Congressional-ExecutiveAgreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 799-800 (2001) (discussing the role of historical practice in foreign affairs powers).
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the U.S. government wishes to remove "an irritant from relations with an
important ally."'22 This concern is particularly important because of the decoupling of individuals from nation-states that has characterized postWorld War II international law, a trend that the events of September 11,
2001 will likely accelerate. The rise of "plaintiff's diplomacy," in which lawsuits by individuals have come to play an increasingly important role in foreign policy, 23 is part of this development. Such lawsuits, brought by private
individuals in U.S. courts, target as defendants not only foreign governments but also corporations and individuals, for claims related to World
War II and the Holocaust, 24 international environmental harm, 25 international human rights violations,2 6 war crimes, 27 and the September 11 attacks. 28 As these cases increase in frequency and importance to U.S. foreign
policy, the power of the President to influence or terminate such litigation
29
also increases in importance.
This Article argues that the courts erred in dismissing the World War IIrelated cases based on the Statements of Interest made pursuant to the sole
executive agreements. Part I provides an introduction to the executive agreements themselves. Part II examines the text of the Constitution and shows
that sole executive agreements terminating domestic litigation stand in
significant tension with the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses. The text of the
Constitution itself does not provide a basis for executive branch lawmaking
of this sort. Deference to sole executive agreements that permit the Executive to achieve this result through the courts, without the participation of
Congress, thus appears to undermine both the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has given some sole executive agreements (and executive orders made pursuant to such agreements) the force of
22. Bettauer, supra note 7, at 10.
23. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000,
at 102.
24. See, e.g., Abrams v. Soci&t Nationale des Chemins de Fer Fran~ais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 E Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 121; Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
25. See, e.g., Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 197 E3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Jora v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26. See,e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d
259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 248 F.3d 915
(9th Cit. 2001).
27. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 E
Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 1998).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, No. 01 Civ. 10132, 2001 WL 1658211
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001). See also 7 Families Sue bin Laden and Others for Billions, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 20,
2002, at All.
29. As an example, on October 15, 2001, eager to strengthen diplomatic ties with Iran during air
strikes against Afghanistan, the Bush administration argued to a federal judge that a case against Iran for
damages arising out of the 1979 hostage crisis should be dismissed. See U.S. Fails in Bid to Block Former
Hostages from Testifying Against Iran; Justice Department Says Accord Bars Claims in 20-Year-Old Issue; ExPrisonerAssails U.S., ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2001, at A7.
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domestic law, the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses notwithstanding. 30 Part III
turns to the Supreme Court, and demonstrates that those cases involved
claims against foreign sovereigns and do not provide a basis for executive
authority over claims against private individuals. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 31 for example, the Supreme Court upheld an executive order nullifying
claims against Iran. The order was made pursuant to an executive agreement, and the court relied in part on the history of executive agreements
that terminated litigation against foreign sovereigns. 32 Thus, a historical
practice of executive agreements that terminated litigation against private
parties would suggest that such agreements may have the force of domestic
law, making deference to such agreements far less problematic. 33 As Part III
shows, however, there is no such historical practice; sole executive agreements have not been used to terminate litigation against private parties.
Also, unlike in Dames & Moore, there is little reason to conclude that Congress favors executive resolution of these claims, when it has acted instead to
increase the scope of human rights and Holocaust-related litigation in U.S.
courts. Therefore, the sources of executive authority that the Supreme Court
relied on in Dames & Moore do not serve as sources of executive authority to
terminate the World War II-related private claims. Without such authority,
the Executive's request for deference creates significant tension with the Supremacy and Treaty Clauses.
Part IV of this Article looks at recent scholarship on sole executive
agreements. If scholars provided convincing arguments that sole executive
agreements have the power to terminate domestic litigation against private
parties, then deference that achieves the same result would present far less
significant Treaty and Supremacy Clause issues. Much scholarship focuses on
the constitutionality of congressional-executive 34 and sole executive 35 agree30. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
31. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
32. Id. at 686.
33. Although Dames & Moore considered an executive order terminating domestic litigation by its own
authority, requests for deference of the sort involved in purely private litigation should be framed by the
constitutional authority of the Executive over the issue on which deference is sought. The Executive's
authority--or lack thereof-to resolve these claims through sole executive agreement is integrally related
to the question of whether or not the courts should defer to the Executive's dismissal requests pursuant to
that agreement. Indeed, the courts (even through the political question doctrine) rely to some extent on
historical practice, but they do so without making the important distinction between claims resolved by
treaties and those resolved by the Executive alone. See generally Bradley, supra note 14, at 659-61, 711
(Some deference to the Executive is actually "judicially permitted" lawmaking by the Executive through
the courts. Deference to the courts on the issue of foreign sovereign immunity might, for example, be
justified by the independent law-making authority of the Executive.).
34. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 801
(1995); Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944); Joel R.
Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671
(1998); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEx. L. REV. 961
(2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221 (1995); Yon, supra note 21.
35. See,e.g.,Paul, supra note 34; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77
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ments, but to the extent that scholars do discuss the claims settlement
36
power, they focus solely on its traditional use against foreign sovereigns.
Scholars have also written extensively about the Holocaust and other World
War II-related litigation in the U.S. courts. 37 Some have discussed 38-and
even criticized 39-the unusual executive agreements with Germany, Austria,
and France, but none have identified or analyzed their constitutional
40
significance.
Part V considers the district court cases that dismissed the World War IIrelated claims both before and after the formal conclusion of the three executive agreements. The courts dismissed the cases based in part on the political
question doctrine and the doctrine of international comity.4 1 Neither provides convincing reasons to dismiss the litigation. Both fail to alert courts to
changes in executive branch practice and expansion of executive authority,
and both overlook how the text of the Constitution allocates authority over
foreign affairs. Applying these doctrines, for example, does not force courts
to consider how deference pursuant to sole executive agreements undermines
the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses. Even aside from the formal conclusion of
the executive agreements, failure to distinguish between executive agreements and treaties caused another problem: courts used international comity
and the political question doctrine to dismiss litigation based in part on the
historical use of treaties to resolve war-related reparations issues, without
distinguishing between treaties and executive agreements (and the authority
each provides for deference). 42 As a result, claims were dismissed on the
N.C.L. REV. 134,234-40 (1998).
36. See Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: ConstitutionalAuthority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1985). See also Ramsey, supra note 35, at 173-83 (providing a historical analysis of sole executive agreements that includes many claims settlement agreements).
37. See, e.g., The Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2001, Fifty Years in the Making: World War If Reparation and Restitution Claims, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Symposium, Holocaust Restitution: Reconciling Moral Imperatives with Legal Initiatives andDiplomacy, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11, 24-25 (2002); Eric Rosand, Confronting the Nazi Past at the End of the 20th Century:
The Austrian Model, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 202 (2002).
39. See, e.g., Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the German
Foundation Law CompensatingSlave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2002);
Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the Executive andJudicialBranches, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 212 (2002).
40. Some authors have also criticized court decisions to dismiss the litigation, but not for the reasons
discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that the political question doctrine did not
apply in Iwanowa because the test was not met and because the executive branch did not intervene); K.
Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 277 (2001) (arguing that application of the political question doctrine in these cases is part of a general trend to limit human rights litigation and that courts should be more receptive to customary human rights norms).
41. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 371; Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (applying political question doctrine to dismiss slave labor claims before the executive agreements); Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp.
2d at 489 (same). I argue that application of the political question doctrine by these courts was in error,
both before and after the executive agreements. See discussion infra Part V.A.
42. The court in Nazi Era Cases reasoned that while "the policy interests articulated in the Statement
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7

grounds that the executive branch sought "government-to-government"
resolution of the litigation, when the historical practice supported resolution
43
by treaty.
Part VI concludes by setting out an alternative approach that has as its
point of departure a careful separation of powers framework beginning with
the textual allocation of authority in the Constitution (including the Supremacy Clause), before considering prior executive branch and congressional practice. Even if these sources provide no definitive answer as to the
scope of executive authority in this area, application of the international
comity and political question doctrines should nonetheless operate within
the framework that these sources create. Finally, most iterations of the political question doctrine speak of the "political branches" as a monolith; in
fact, as the World War II-related litigation illustrates, both state and federal
legislatures are often in conflict with the executive branch. 44 Courts should
seek to identify such conflict; where it exists they should hesitate to defer.

I.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE, GERMANY, AND AUSTRIA

The United States has increasingly become the forum for lawsuits alleging human rights violations, environmental harms, war crimes, and other
international harms that take place in foreign countries. 45 Much of this litigation has been brought under the Alien Tort Statute. 46 Litigation during
the 1990s against a variety of corporate defendants for World War II-related
of Interest do not in and of themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal, the longstanding foreign policy commitment to resolving claims arising out of World War II and the Holocaust
at a governmental level does provide such a basis." 129 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (emphasis added). The court
went on to say that rejecting the Statement of Interest and permitting the case to go forward
would unacceptably intrude into the foreign policy determinations of our government. Such a decision
would in effect say that the [German] Foundation and all of the treaties that have gone before are inadequate, and that this Court could somehow do a better job of fashioning relief for victims of the
Nazi era.
Id. at 383 (emphasis added). The court, in other words, used the history of mostly treaties that resolve
World War II-related claims to support deference to the Executive alone. This is particularly problematic
where the bid for deference has the effect of implementing an international agreement as domestic law
without the participation of the Senate, but this reasoning is also used erroneously to support deference
even in cases not involving formal executive agreements. In Iwanowa, for example, the court dismissed
the case in part on political question grounds, relying heavily on the "executive branch's commitment to
resolving individual claims arising out of World War II through government-to-government negotiations." 67 E Supp. 2d at 487. The problem with this reasoning is that a history of resolving an issue by
treaty does not support the dismissal of otherwise valid claims in favor of negotiations or informal statements by the executive branch.
43. See, e.g., Nazi Era Cases, 129 F Supp. 2d at 371-72; lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87.
44. See, e.g., Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F 3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering the constitutionality of a California statute called the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of
1999). The court noted letters in which executive branch officials argued the law interfered with the
government's policy on Holocaust-related claims, but it concluded that Congress was aware of, and encouraged, state initiatives like those of California. Id. at 749. See also Carolyn Skorneck, Bill to Allow U.S.
POWs to SueJapan, AP ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 16546640 (quoting a member of the House of
Representatives who stated that "[o]ur own State Department is the biggest obstacle to justice").
45. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 23, at 102-03.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
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atrocities is one part of this general development. Perhaps most prominently, class action litigation against Swiss banks ended in a $1.25 billion
settlement, negotiated in part by then Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat. 47 Other World War 11-related litigation targeted (among other defendants) 48 Japanese corporations; 49 European insurance companies and their
52
affiliates; 50 French railroads; 51 French, Austrian, and German banks; and
53
other German and Austrian corporations. Pressure from Germany, France,
and Austria on the United States led to the three executive agreements that
make clear, they
attempted to resolve some of these cases. As the agreements
54
are specifically designed to end the U.S. litigation.
The three agreements are similar in structure. Each requires the establishment of a foundation with contributions from the foreign government
and from private companies. 55 Individual claimants may apply to the foundation for compensation for their injuries. 56 The agreements specifically set
and provide many
out the claims and claimants covered by the foundations,
57
details of the oversight and administration of the funds.
The agreements do differ somewhat in scope and in detail. The German
Agreement is the broadest, covering all claims against German companies
arising from the National Socialist era and World War 11.58 The Austrian
Agreement also applies to all Austrian companies but includes only claims
related to slave or forced labor, as defined by the agreement. 59 The French
Agreement applies only to claims against French banks arising out of World
War 11.60

47. SeeBettauer, supra note 7, at 5; Madeline Doms, Comment, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and
Forced Labor: The Swiss Bank Settlement and the German FoundationProvide Options for Recovery for Holocaust
Survivors, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 171, 174, 193-94 (2001).
48. See Bazyler, supra note 40.
49. See, e.g., In re World War 11 Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal.
2001). See generally Sean D. Murphy, World War II Era Claims AgainstJapanese Companies, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 139 (2001) (describing litigation against Japanese corporations).
50. See, e.g., Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001).
51. See, e.g., Abrams v. Socit6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Franqais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
52. See, e.g., D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F3d 78 (2d Cit. 2001) (German and Austrian banks);
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 E Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (French bank).
53. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999).
54. See, e.g., FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1(1); GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2,
pmbl., art. 1(1); AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1(1).
55. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1(1); GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, pmbl.;
AUSTRIAN AGreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
56. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, annex B; GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex A; AusTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, annex A.
57. For instance, the agreements supply the standard of proof to apply to claims, as well as the composition of the foundations' boards of directors. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, annex B.IB; GERMAN
AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex A.9; AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, annex A.7.
58. GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
59. AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
60. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
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All three agreements note that the companies and banks are seeking "allembracing and enduring legal peace" for claims arising out of the National
Socialist Era and World War 11.61 To this end, they all obligate the United
States to file "Statements of Interest" in any litigation that raises claims covered by the agreements, 62 and carefully set forth the statements' content.
The statements must explain that the United States, in its foreign policy
interests, would like to see the claims resolved outside of litigation, that the
funds established by the agreements provide quicker and easier ways of resolving the claims than litigation, and that the claims face significant legal
63
hurdles in U.S. courts.

61. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, pmbl. (referring just to "World War II" not "National Socialist Era"); GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, pmbl.; AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT, .rupra note 3, pmbl.
62. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 2; GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 2(1); AusTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
63. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, annex C; GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex B; AusTRIAN AGREEMENT, supra note 3, annex B. The German Agreement, for example, provides
Pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 1, the United States will timely file a Statement of Interest and accompanying formal foreign policy statement of the Secretary of State and Declaration of Deputy
Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat in all pending and future cases, regardless of whether the
plaintiff(s) consent(s) to dismissal, in which the United States is notified that a claim has been asserted against German companies arising from the National Socialist era and World War II. The
Statement of Interest will make the following points:
1. As indicated by his letter of December 13, 1999, the President of the United States has concluded that it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the Foundation to be
the exclusive forum and remedy for the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II, including without
limitation those relating to slave and forced labor, aryanization, medical experimentation, children's
homes/Kinderheim, other cases of personal injury, and damage to or loss of property, including
banking assets and insurance policies.
2. Accordingly, the United States believes that all asserted claims should be pursued (or in the event
Foundation funds have been exhausted, should timely have been pursued) through the Foundation
instead of the courts.
3. As the President said in his letter of December 13, 1999, dismissal of the lawsuit, which touches
on the foreign policy interests of the United States, would be in the foreign policy interests of the
United States. The United States will recommend dismissal on any valid legal ground (which, under
the U.S. system of jurisprudence, will be for the U.S. courts to determine). The United States will
explain that, in the context of the Foundation, it is in the enduring and high interest of the United
States to support efforts to achieve dismissal of all National Socialist and World War II era cases
against German companies. The United States will explain fully its foreign policy interests in
achieving dismissal, as set forth below.
4. The United States' interests include the interest in a fair and prompt resolution of the issues involved in these lawsuits to bring some measure of justice to the victims of the National Socialist era
and World War II in their lifetimes; the interest in the furtherance of the close cooperation this
country has with our important European ally and economic partner, Germany; the interest in
maintaining good relations with Israel and other Western, Central, and Eastern European nations,
from which many of those who suffered during the National Socialist era and World War II come;
and the interest in achieving legal peace for asserted claims against German companies arising from
their involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II.
5. The Foundation is a fulfillment of a half-century effort to complete the task of bringing justice
to victims of the Holocaust and victims of National Socialist persecution. It complements
significant prior German compensation, restitution, and pension programs for acts arising out of the
National Socialist era and World War II. For the last 55 years, the United States has sought to work
with Germany to address the consequences of the National Socialist era and World War I through
political and governmental acts between the United States and Germany.
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Unlike the Swiss Bank cases, these executive agreements did not settle the
cases, nor did the agreements themselves extinguish the legal claims.64 As a
result, none of the protections afforded to class action settlements applied in
these cases. 65 Instead, the governments banked on the deference that the
U.S. courts would give to the executive branch's Statements of Interest requesting the dismissal of the cases. For Germany, the concern that courts
would not dismiss the cases when so requested posed a threat to the negotiations that nearly prevented an agreement. 66 Ultimately, however, the State
Department convinced Germany and then the other foreign governments
that the Statements of Interest constituted "enduring legal peace" in the
U.S. courts. 67 By the time the Statements of Interest were filed in court, they
were backed by considerable momentum: a $4.3 billion resolution (in the
German case alone) was premised upon dismissal of the U.S. litigation at the
68
insistence of the executive branch.
6. The participation in the Foundation not only by the German Government and German companies that existed during the National Socialist era, but also by German companies that did not exist
during the National Socialist era, allows comprehensive coverage of slave and forced laborers and
other victims.
7. Plaintiffs in these cases face numerous legal hurdles, including, without limitation, justiciability,
international comity, statutes of limitation, jurisdictional issues, forum non conveniens, difficulties
of proof, and certification of a class of heirs. The United States takes no position here on the merits
of the legal claims or arguments advanced by plaintiffs or defendants. The United States does not
suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an independent
legal basis for dismissal, but will reinforce the point that U.S. policy interests favor dismissal on any
valid legal ground.
8. The Foundation is fair and equitable, based on: (a) the advancing age of the plaintiffs, their need
for a speedy, non-bureaucratic resolution, and the desirability of expending available funds on victims rather than litigation; (b) the Foundation's level of funding, allocation of its funds, payment
system, and eligibility criteria; (c) the difficult legal hurdles faced by plaintiffs and the uncertainty
of their litigation prospects; and (d) in light of the particular difficulties presented by the asserted
claims of heirs, the programs to benefit heirs and others in the Future Fund.
9. The structure and operation of the Foundation will assure (or has assured) swift, impartial,
dignified, and enforceable payments; appropriately extensive publicity has been given concerning its
existence, its objectives, and the availability of funds, and the Foundation's operation is open and
accountable.
GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex B.
64. Bettauer, supra note 7, at 6-8.
65. See Ratner, supra note 39, at 224-32.
66. See Edmund L. Andrews, Talks with Germany on Fundfor Victims of Nazi Slave Labor Are Snagged b
a Legal Issue, N.Y TIMEs, June 3, 2000, at A6.
67. Se John Burgess, U.S., Germany Act to Clear Way for Slave-Labor Compensation, WASH. POST, June
13, 2000, at A15. Burgess noted that
after 10 hours of talks in Washington, the teams reached a deal under which the Clinton administration would throw its full authority behind efforts to dismiss 55 lawsuits that are pending
against German companies for their use of the labor .... Under the accord, the Clinton administration would formally state in court that it believes it is in the foreign policy interests of the United
States to dismiss pending and future lawsuits .... Since the judicial system is independent in this
country, the White House cannot guarantee it can end the lawsuits. Nonetheless, German govemment negotiator Otto Graf Lambsdorff said that 'we have come as close as possible under the given
circumstances.'
68. Adler & Zumbansen, supra note 39, at 3-4. The German law establishing the German Foundation
requires that the Bundestag (lower house of German parliament) wait until lawsuits pending in the
United States are dismissed before certifying that final legal peace has been achieved; only after such
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Not surprisingly, as courts have begun to consider these Statements of Interest they have honored the request of the State Department and dismissed
litigation against private corporate defendants. 69 In so doing, courts have
used the political question and international comity doctrines to sanction a
sole executive agreement (not a treaty or congressional-executive agreement)
that hinged upon successful executive branch termination of litigation
against private parties. As discussed at length in Part V below, these doctrines provide no convincing basis for dismissal, and in applying them the
courts failed to see the shift in executive branch practice, failed to understand that practice itself creates an important constitutional basis for future
executive branch action, and failed to understand the extent to which such
deference circumvents the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses. In other words,
these decisions themselves create important precedent for the executive
branch. The next such agreement, after all, will be negotiated based on the
success of these agreements-an issue to which the courts, and the doctrines
they employed, have been entirely blind.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

Termination of domestic litigation by the courts in deference to a sole executive agreement stands in significant tension with the Supremacy and
Treaty Clauses of the Constitution. Article II gives the President the power,
"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. 70° Generations of scholars
have struggled to clarify what power the President has to enter into international agreements other than treaties. 71 For its part, Article I, Section 10
distinguishes between "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" on the one
hand, and an "Agreement or Compact" on the other.7 2 The former are absolutely forbidden to states, while the latter are forbidden to states "without
the Consent of Congress. '73 This distinction suggests that the framers contemplated international agreements other than "Treaties," but provides no
guidance as to how the federal government may conclude non-treaty agreements. Similar distinctions made in the Articles of Confederation7 4 and by

certification, which was made on May 30, 2001, could payments begin. Id. at 4.
69. Nazi Era Cases, 129 E Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.N.J. 2001). See also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67
F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing slave labor claims against private corporations based in
part on negotiations between the United States and Germany under comity and political question doctrines); Burger-Fischer,65 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (dismissing slave labor claims against private corporations
based in part on negotiations between the United States and Germany under the political question doctrine).
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
71. See, e.g., SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 102-33 (2d ed.
1916); Raoul Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972); Myres S.
McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3.
73. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
74. See CRANDALL, supra note 71, at 24-25.
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eighteenth-century international law scholars support the conclusion that
use of the word "Treaty" in Article II was deliberate, and not intended by
75
the Framers to include all international agreements.
Scholars, even those who take a dim view of the President's power to enter
into non-treaty international agreements, have almost unanimously concluded that the President has at least some power to enter into some executive agreements without a two-thirds vote of the Senate. 76 This conclusion is
supported by use of the word "Treaty" in Article II as distinguished from the
other, broader terms used in Article I, Section 10; the unbroken history of
sole executive agreements; 77 the functional argument that it would be
difficult to run the executive branch without some power to enter into
agreements without the approval of the Senate; 78 and the vesting of the "executive Power" with the President. 79 There is little agreement, however, on
the scope of such power. 80
Explicit textual grants of authority to the President provide one way of
defining the President's power to enter into sole executive agreements. 81 In
particular, such authority may come from the "Commander in Chief'
power,82 the power to make treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate),8 3 the power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,"8 4 and
the "take Care" Clause. 85 For example, some view military agreementssuch as those that negotiate an armistice ending hostilities,8 6 that arrange for
an exchange of prisoners,8 7 that provide for foreign troops to pass through the

75. See Ramsey, supra note 35, at 160-73.
76. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 34, at 67 3-74 (arguing against the interchangeability of executive
agreements and treaties but acknowledging the President's power to enter into some sole executive
agreements); Tribe, supra note 34. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(4) (1987) thereinafter RESTATEMENT). Those who have not include
David Gray Alder, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, inTHE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996), and Berger, supra
note 71, at 55.
77. See John Bassett, International Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 15 YALE L.J.
63 (1905).
78. Borchard, supra note 34, at 673. See also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 815.
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over ForeignAffairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 264 (2001) (arguing that the executive power vests the President
with the authority to enter into non-treaty agreements).
80. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 219-24 (2d ed. 1996).
81. The Restatement of the Law on Foreign Relations provides that "the President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent
powers under the Constitution." RESTATEMENT, supra note 76, § 303(4).
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
83. Id.art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
84. Id.art.
II, § 3.
85. Id. McDougal and Lans argue that this clause gives the President the power to negotiate executive
agreements in furtherance of treaty and other international agreement obligations, and provides authority
for the Boxer Protocol of 1900. McDougal & Lans, supra note 71, at 248 n.150.
86. See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 241 (1922); Borchard,
supra note 34, at 673-74 (noting the August 12, 1898 agreement with France setting the basic conditions for peace with Spain, an agreement that was confirmed by a treaty several months later).
87. Borchard, supra note 34, at 673-74.
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United States88 or, in some circumstances that establish mutual defense
agreements 89-- as coming within the Commander-in-Chief power. The power
to negotiate treaties and/or the executive power itself, many agree, confers
on the President the power to enter into temporary agreements pending a
treaty (often called modi vivendi), 90 such as agreements related to fishing
rights, 91 international boundaries, 92 and agreements to attempt treaty negotiations. 93 Some have reasoned that the President's authority to receive ambassadors under Article II includes the power to recognize (or not recognize)
foreign governments and the power to conclude agreements related to such
94
recognition.
Whatever the appropriate line between sole executive agreements and
treaties, the text of the Constitution seems clear that only treaties have the
force of domestic law. The text of the Constitution makes "Treaties" the "supreme Law of the Land." Because the Supremacy Clause applies to treaties
and not to non-treaty agreements (like "Compacts," "Agreements," and "Alliances") mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution, such other agreements do
not come within the plain language of the Supremacy Clause. The Supreme
Court held in United States v. Belmont, however, that some sole executive
agreements do trump inconsistent state law, because of the broad powers of
the executive branch over foreign affairs. 95 Belmont is discussed further in the
following Part.
Constitutional text leaves us, therefore, with a strong argument in favor of
presidential power to enter into some kinds of non-treaty executive agreements. The Supremacy Clause, however, provides a strong textual reason for
concluding that non-treaty agreements lack the force of domestic law. Deference by the courts to sole executive agreements, particularly where such deference has the effect of terminating litigation pursuant to such agreements,
thus stands in considerable tension with the limits the text of the Constitution places on executive authority. As discussed in the next Part, however,
the Supreme Court has held that at least some sole executive agreements can
terminate domestic litigation, the Supremacy and Treaty clauses notwithstanding. If the World War II-related executive agreements have the same
88. See WRIGHT, supra note 86, at 242 (noting that between 1882 and 1896, U.S. Presidents made a
series of agreements with Mexico permitting the pursuit of Indians into U.S. territory).
89. See, e.g., MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE: DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS, U.S.Vietnam, Mar. 1, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 837. See also McDougal & Lans, supra note 71, at 247 n.139 (citing the
bases-for-destroyers deal of 1940 and the 1940 Canadian-American defense agreement). Others argue
that "[e]very arms control agreement since 1972 has been approved as a treaty" and that treaties have
been consistently used for mutual security pacts, including NATO, several bilateral security agreements,
and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. Spiro, supra note 34, at 996-99.
90. See WRIGHT, supra note 86, at 239-40.
91. CRANDALL, supra note 71, at 112-13 (discussing several examples).
92. See Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288 (Wash. 1870).
93. WRIGHT, supra note 86, at 243.
94. Id. at 268-69. See Bloom, supra note 36, at 163. But see Berger, supra note 71, at 5, 17-19 (citing
The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)).
95. 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937). See discussion infra Part III.A.
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power, then dismissing litigation in deference to the executive branch is in
significantly less tension with the Supremacy Clause.
III.

CASE LAW AND HISTORICAL PRACTICE

The Supreme Court has upheld the termination of domestic litigation
96
through sole executive agreement in three cases: United States v. Belmont,
97
98
United States v. Pink, and Dames & Moore v. Regan. This Part discusses
these cases and concludes that although they might provide a basis for executive lawmaking that would support deference to the Statements of Interest filed pursuant to the German, French, and Austrian agreements, in fact
they do not. Historical practice, upon which Dames & Moore relies in part,
might also have provided a basis for executive authority that justifies deference to these sole executive agreements (the Supremacy and Treaty Clauses
notwithstanding), but it does not. Even the recent actions by Congress, 99
from which one might infer congressional approval of executive resolution of
the World War II-related cases, suggest instead that Congress supports the
resolution of such issues by the courts. By this measure, too, the executive
branch lacks law-making authority to resolve these claims by sole executive
agreement. The deference of the courts thus permits the Executive to achieve
what it otherwise lacks the constitutional authority to do.
A. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court considered in both Belmont and Pink an agreement by
the United States to assume certain claims that the government of the Soviet
Union had against U.S. nationals (the "Litvinov Assignment"). 100 In Belmont,
the U.S. government claimed that the assignment included funds held by
August Belmont, a New York banker, for the Petrograd Metalworks, a company whose assets were nationalized by the Soviet government. 0 1 The
96. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
97. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
98. 453 U.S. 654(1981).
99. See infra notes 251-260 and accompanying text.
100. The Litvinov Assignment was part of a 1933 exchange of correspondence between President
Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Oct. 20Nov. 23, 1933, reprintedin 78 CONG. REc. 463-68 (1934). The agreement provided, in part, that
Ithe Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not take any steps to enforce any
decisions of courts or initiate any new litigations [sic] for the amounts admitted to be due or that
may be found to be due it, as the successor of prior Governments of Russia, or otherwise, from
American nationals, including corporations, companies, partnerships, or associations, and also the
claim ,against the United States of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, now in litigation in the United
States Court of Claims, and will not object to such amounts being assigned and does hereby release
and assign all such amounts to the Government of the United States, the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to be duly notified in each case of any amount realized by the Government of the United States from such release and assignment.
Id. at 466.
101. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 325-27. Petrograd had deposited the funds prior to the nationalization of
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United States sued to recover the deposits, relying on the Litvinov Assignment. Belmont argued in response that the Soviet nationalization of Petrograd Metalworks' assets in New York violated New York public policy and
that the Soviet Union accordingly never owned the claim and could not have
transferred it to the United States. 02 The lower courts held for Belmont,
reasoning that the bank deposit was located in New York, that the Soviet
nationalization decree conflicted with New York public policy against enforcing foreign confiscatory decrees, and that questions of title to property in
03
New York were questions of New York law.'
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that courts are bound by decisions
of the "political departments of the government" about the recognition of
foreign governments. 0 4 Recognition, in turn, legitimates the acts (i.e., nationalization decrees) of the recognized government within its own territory.10 5 In this case, the President negotiated the Litvinov Assignment as
part of a deal that led to U.S. recognition of the Soviet government, putting
the assignment within the "competence of the President."'' 0 6 As to the issue
of what domestic effect the Litvinov Assignment had, the Court reasoned
that although it lacked the advice and consent of the Senate, was not a
treaty, and did not come within the "express language" of the Supremacy
Clause, it nonetheless had the same effect, based on the "complete power" of
07
the national government over "international affairs."
In Pink, decided several years after Belmont, the United States brought suit
against the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York to recover
funds deposited by Russian insurance companies subsequently nationalized
by the Soviet Union. 0 8 The lower courts denied the claim, distinguishing
Belmont on the grounds that it had decided only that the United States had a
cause of action and that the New York courts had not refused to give effect
to the Soviet decrees. In Pink, on the other hand, the New York courts had
held that the Litvinov Assignment did not intend to contravene state law or
policy governing the distribution of assets of Russian insurance companies
that were located outside the Soviet Union. 0 9
Again, the Supreme Court reversed," 0 relying, like Belmont, in part on
broad language from United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Co.'I that identified the President as the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of

its assets in 1918. Id.at 326.
102. See id. at 327.
103. Seeid.
104. Id. at 327-28.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 330.
107. See id. at 331.
108. Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-11.
109. United States v. Pink, 32 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y 1940), rev'd, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also Moscow
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N.Y & Trust Co., 20 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y 1939).
110. Pink, 315 U.S. at 203.
111. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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international relations." 112 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld an executive
order prohibiting the sale of arms to certain parties in South America
against a claim that the order violated the non-delegation doctrine.1 13 The
Court's famous opinion by Justice Sutherland articulated a sweeping, extraconstitutional theory of federal and executive branch supremacy in the area
of foreign affairs-a theory that has come under extensive attack by scholars. 114 The Pink decision also cited to Belmont in concluding that in respect
to "all international compacts and foreign relations115generally," state lines
disappear and the "state of New York does not exist."
Despite the sweeping language in Belmont and Pink, neither authorizes executive branch settlement of claims against private parties. As an initial
matter, subsequent Supreme Court opinions have backed away from the6
broad language in these cases and from the reasoning in Curtiss-Wright.1
Moreover, both Belmont and Pink involved the assignment of claims by the
Soviet government to the United States. The claims so assigned were claims
against U.S. nationals or the U.S. government, but they were claims at least
arguably held by the Soviet Union. Some nominally private litigation was
resolved by the Litvinov Assignment, but it was litigation against private
117
parties that had been nationalized by the Soviet Union.

112. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 (quoting Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 318).
113. Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 320-29.
114. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (describing attacks on Curtiss-Wright).
115. Pink, 315 U.S. at 234 (quoting Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331).
116. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the President's
foreign affairs power must be grounded either in the Constitution or in an act of Congress); Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 661-62 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J.,concurring).
117. See HENKIN, supra note 80, at 221 (describing Belmont as involving "an agreement to settle
claims by the United States and by U.S. citizens against the Soviet Union"). For example, in 1931 the
Ohio Attorney General sued the Northern Insurance Company of Moscow, which had deposited
$100,000 with the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance in 1911. Bettman v. N. Ins. Co. of Moscow, 27
Ohio Law Abs. 112 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938), affd, 16 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1938). The suit alleged that the
company was defunct and the total on deposit should be distributed among its creditors. Id. The company answered on behalf of its former director, alleging that the company had been unlawfully nationalized by the Soviets and claiming the Ohio deposit for the director. Various interested parties intervened,
including lawyers in Columbus, Ohio, seeking compensation for $20,000 worth of legal services for the
company, and the U.S. government, which claimed that the total on deposit had been nationalized by the
Soviet government along with the rest of the company's assets, and transferred to the U.S. government
via the Litvinov Assignment. Id. The trial court ordered that the lawyers be paid, refusing to recognize
the confiscatory decree. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the attorneys were not entitled to
the fees, at least not until the ownership of the fund was determined. Id. Ultimately, the attorneys did
not get paid. STEPHEN M. MILLETT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V BELMONT 223-24 (1990). Ignoring the participation of the Ohio and
New York Attorneys General, who did not appear to have their own claims to the fund, the conflict in
the case started as one between private parties-the former board members, the Ohio attorneys, and
other claimants-but the Litvinov Assignment (the United States argued) made the United States the
new owner of the funds. The Lirvinov Assignment only applied, however, because the Soviet Union
claimed (or could have claimed) that the deposit belonged to it, by virtue of the nationalization decree. It
was the Soviet action, not the executive agreement, which turned the conflict into one between a private
party and the foreign sovereign. The effect of the Litvinov Assignment on the ultimate disposition of the
fund is unclear from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion, which merely affirmed the decision of the Court
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Almost a half-century later the Supreme Court returned to the question of
executive settlement of claims against foreign sovereigns and distanced itself
substantially from the reasoning of Belmont and Pink. In Dames & Moore the
Court considered (among other issues) the President's authority to suspend
claims against Iran and its state-owned corporations that were then pending
in U.S. courts." 8 An executive order, made pursuant to an executive agreement negotiated in Algiers between Iran and the United States, "suspended"
all "claims which may be presented to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal," and
provided that such claims "shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United States."" 9
The Court concluded that no statute specifically authorized this part of
the Executive Order. 120 Rather than relying on the President's own authority
over foreign affairs, however, as the Belmont opinion had, the Court relied
instead upon Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube, 121 and backed away from the broad statement of executive power in
Curtiss-Wright.122 Applying Justice Jackson's famous concurrence, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that although the order was not specifically authorized
by statute, Congress had delegated broad general authority to the President
to act in times of national emergency, 23 had long acquiesced in the settlement by the President of claims against foreign sovereigns, 24 and had "implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agree26
ment" 25 by enacting the International Claims Settlement Act.
The Dames & Moore case itself involved only claims against the government of Iran (including agencies and state-owned corporations)--not Iranian
nationals. The Executive Order in Dames & Moore suspended all claims that
could be presented to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. 127 The claims tribunal,
according to the Algiers Accords, had jurisdiction over "claims of nationals
of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the
United States," and limited counterclaims. 128 On the face of the agreement,
therefore, the claims tribunal had no jurisdiction over claims between U.S.

of Appeals; the case was sent back to trial court to resolve ownership of the fund, with the observation
that Belmont would be "pertinent" when the court below determines who owns the fund. Bettman, 27
Ohio Law Abs. at 112.
118. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-88.
119. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24, 1981).
120. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-77.
121. 343 U.S. at 634.
122. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661-62.
123. See id. at 677 (citing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Hostage Act).
124. Seeid. at 678-82.
125. Id. at 680-81.
126. 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2002).
127. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 666 (citing Exec. Order 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. at 14,111).
128. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, DEP'T ST. BuLL., Feb. 1981, at 1, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (Jan.
19, 1981).
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and Iranian nationals. Not surprisingly, given this language, the claims trito exclude cases brought
bunal subsequently interpreted its own jurisdiction 129
by U.S. nationals against private Iranian companies.
Moreover, the Dames & Moore opinion carefully avoided the issue of executive settlement of claims against private defendants, by emphasizing that
"[w]e do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle
claims, even as againstforeign governmental entities."'130 The Court's care in referring to foreign governmental entities here was no accident. This phrase
was taken directly from a First Circuit case, Chas. T Main International,Inc.
v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 13 1 in which there was considerable disagreement about potential executive authority over private litigation between the concurring and majority opinions. Judge (now Justice) Breyer's
concurrence concluded that the President had specific congressional authorization to nullify the claims in question, and criticized the majority for concluding that the President had inherent authority to do so. 132 Inherent authority, Breyer reasoned, presented more problems than the majority acknowledged because the defendant was not the government of Iran itself,
but instead a state-owned company that resembled, in some senses, a "for13
eign individual. "'
Once this potential impact of the majority's opinion on claims against
foreign individuals is clear, Breyer went on, "one becomes uncertain about
the validity of [the Court's] broad assertion of inherent Presidential
power."'134 Noting that the President lacks the power to seize a domestic
steel mill without congressional approval, 135 Breyer asked:
Does he nonetheless have 'the power to seize an American's claim
against, say, a foreign steel mill, even in the face of Congressional silence or opposition? The answer to this question is not given in the
precedents the court cites for they are cases decided prior to evolution of
the restrictive view [of foreign sovereign immunity 36] or involve
claims against a foreign government rather than a private citizen or
both. One suspects the answer to this question depends upon the nature
Congress is actively opof the emergency facing the President, whether
137
posed and whether compensation is granted.

129. See, e.g., Hollyfield v. Iran, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 276 (1989).
130. Dames v. Moore, 453 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
131. Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981). The
full sentence in the First Circuit opinion reads: "We need not and do not hold that the executive possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities." Id. at 814.
132. Chas. T Main, 651 E.2d at 816 (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. Id. at817.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tuhe, 343 U.S. at 579).
136. See infra note 260.
137. Chas. T Main, 651 F.2d at 817 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Breyer's concurrence, in other words, raised the very question to which this
Article is directed. 138 The two other Judges on the First Circuit panel rejected Breyer's argument that the majority opinion had any implications
outside the context of litigation against foreign entities, but accepted the
broader point that suits against foreign sovereigns stand on different footing
from those against private parties, and that the power to settle the former
39
ought not be conflated with the power to settle the latter.
Like Belmont and Pink, the Dames & Moore litigation left unresolved the
question of plenary or sole executive branch authority over litigation against
private parties, and also highlighted the fluidity between governments and
nationals, at least in the context of government-owned corporations. Dames
& Moore also, however, provided a framework for analyzing executive authority that looks both at congressional intent and the history of the practice in
question. The next Part applies this analysis and considers whether the historical practice of claims settlement by the Executive provides authority over
claims like those at issue in the World War I-related cases. However, the
claims settlement history to which Dames & Moore cites is, as Justice Breyer
commented, a history of claims settlement against foreign sovereigns, and so
too are the other indicia of congressional acquiescence to which Justice
Rehnquist referred.
B. HistoricalPractice
As Part I detailed, the text of the Constitution provides no clear authority
for the executive branch to nullify private claims through a sole executive
agreement; in fact, the Supremacy Clause suggests that only treaties, and not
executive agreements, have this power. Current Supreme Court case law
holds that the Executive does have (at least in some situations) the power to
nullify claims against foreign sovereigns, but the Court has declined to address whether such power extends to claims against private parties. Dames &
Moore, however, directs the courts to consider the history of the practice in
question, and Congress's possible acquiescence in any such practice, as partial measures of executive authority over domestic litigation through sole
executive agreements. 140 This Part considers this history, and concludes that
there is neither a long-standing history of executive branch settlement of
claims against private parties, nor any other indicia of Congressional ap-

138. This Article does not discuss the Takings Clause, a topic beyond its scope. See David J. Bederman
& John W. Borchert, International Decisions, Abraham-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 533 (1998) (analyzing a recent Takings Clause challenge to the U.S. government's espousal of
private claims of less than $250,000 before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, pursuant to the claims settlement agreement with Iran).
139. The majority reasoned that suits against government corporations are "closely akin" to suits
against governments themselves, and that it viewed "neither [its] holding nor [its] analysis as having any
necessary implications for the broad class of suits against foreign individuals and private commercial
entities discussed by the concurring opinion." Chas. T Main, 651 E2d at 814.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
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proval of such practice. In fact, recent actions by Congress suggest that it
supports resolution of claims such as those at issue here by the courts, rather
than through executive agreement. 14 1 The executive branch lacks any general authority to terminate ongoing private litigation in the foreign policy
interests of the United States, based either on constitutional text or historical practice.
1. Espousaland State Responsibility
Historically, 'claims settlement by the executive branch has been closely
tied to the doctrines of espousal and state responsibility. An individual
harmed by a foreign government in violation of international law generally
has no capacity to bring a claim, for individuals are not considered the "subjects" of international law. 142 Instead, the injury to the individual is considered injury to his or her government, which would then have a claim under
international law against the injuring state. 43 In so doing, the "injured"
state espouses the claim of its national-in other words, it adopts the claim
and presses diplomatically for compensation for the injury. 144 States have
claims based only on the injuries of their nationals.145 In the United States,
the executive branch decides whether, and under what conditions, to press
claims of injury to its nationals with other nations. It also decides whether
to compromise or abandon such claims, even over the objection of the injured national. 146 Injury to an alien violates international law only if a foreign state is responsible for that injury. 47 International law has developed
complicated rules of "state responsibility" for injury to aliens, some of which
provide that states may be responsible for injuries inflicted by private parties
if they did not adequately protect aliens, 148 or failed to provide aliens access
to courts or judicial remedies. 149 A corresponding prerequisite for bringing a
141. This Part may miss some such agreements; many were likely preserved, if at all, only in foreign
diplomatic offices. Some agreements, even in U.S. State Department archives, may not have made their
way into electronic databases and/or collections of treaties and executive agreements. For example, a 1990
claims settlement agreement between the United States and Iran is documented in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal Reporter but not on Westlaw or Lexis. See 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 327 (1990).
142. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD; OR THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 16-18 (1915); 1 RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 1 (1975). See also Panevezys-

Saldutiskis Railway Case (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.Ij. (ser. A/B) No. 76 (Feb. 28) (describing diplomatic
protection in terms of a state asserting its own right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect for the
rule of international law).
143. RESTATEMENT, Supra note 76, § 713 cmt. a. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 482-96 (5th ed. 1998).
144. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 76, § 713 cmt. a; 8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1216-33 (1967).
145. See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 482.
146. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 76, § 713 cmt. a; 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 1216-33.
147. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 76, §§ 207, 711 cmt. a; MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
542-45 (4th ed. 1997).
148. See BORCHARD, supra note 142, at 217-26.
149. See id. at 283-84.
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claim of state responsibility for injury to an alien is the exhaustion of local
remedies. 150
Diplomatic claims presented by the United States to foreign governments
are, accordingly, claims against the foreign governments themselves, consistent with the international law upon which such claims are based. 15" Thus
historically, diplomatic settlement of such claims was unlikely to affect any
private claims because international law required that the private claims be
exhausted before the diplomatic claims were lodged, and because domestic
claims against foreign sovereigns for injuries that occurred abroad in any
event were likely barred for jurisdictional reasons, as well as by the doctrine
152
of foreign sovereign immunity.
2. The Wilmington Packet
Settlement of claims concerning The Wilmington Packet illustrates the traditional doctrines of espousal and state responsibility. In 1799, William
Vans Murray, the U.S. diplomatic representative to the Netherlands (then
called the Batavian Republic), negotiated an agreement that settled the
claim of an American citizen against the Netherlands. 153 This was the nation's first sole executive agreement.154
The claim involved an American schooner, The Wilmington Packet, that had
been seized by a Dutch privateer in 1793 and taken to the island of St. Martin. 155 Once there, a Dutch prize tribunal condemned the cargo as a lawful
prize; the Packet then sailed home to Charleston. 156 An American firm with
an interest in the freight pressured the State Department to seek compensation from the Dutch government on the grounds that the cargo was improperly condemned in violation of a treaty between the Netherlands and the
United States. 157 In the 1799 agreement, the Dutch government agreed to
pay 20,000 florins in exchange for an "acquittance" from the United States
"in full of all claims."' 58 The Dutch blamed the delay in settlement on the

150. Id. at 332. See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 496--506.
151. 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 144, at 1217.
152. See generally SHAW, supra note 147, at 453-540 (discussing jurisdictional limitations and immunities).
153. AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS (BATAVIAN REPUBLIC), U.S.-Neth., Dec. 7-12, 1799, reprinted in 5 T EATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1075-78
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931-1948) [hereinafter MILLER].
154. An earlier postal agreement was the first congressional-executive agreement.
155. See Letter from W.V. Murray to Batavian Minister of Foreign Relations, Dec. 26, 1798, reprinted
in 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 1085.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1081.
158. Letter from W.V. Murray to U.S. Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1799, reprinted in 5 MILLER, supra
note 153, at 1099. The release signed by Murray declared, in part, that
for this sum in the name of and for the captured or those qualify'd to desist from all claim right or
demand of all actions and pretentions on account of suffered damages & loss of gain of whatever nature which the captured might pretend under pretence of the capture. All which rights and claims
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refusal of the interested Americans to pursue an appeal in the Dutch courts
from the decision of the St. Martin prize court. 159 Thus, any rights to an
appeal, or any claim against the privateer itself, were relinquished through
this sole executive agreement.
Even this first use of sole executive power to settle claims illustrates the
interplay between private and government actors. The Americans with an
interest in the freight complained that the actions of a privateer 16° -a private ship commissioned by the Dutch government to take prizes-together
with the condemnation of the cargo by the St. Martin prize court, violated
Dutch treaty obligations. Nothing in the correspondence suggests, however,
that the agreement nullified a claim cognizable in a U.S. court (although it
may well have cut off rights against the privateer cognizable in Dutch
courts); indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a U.S. court would have either
personal jurisdiction over the privateer or subject matter jurisdiction over
161
the lawfulness of the prize.
3. Executive Claims Settlement in the Nineteenth Century
In the first part of the nineteenth century, executive claims settlement was
relatively rare, and the claims settled were similar to those involved in the
Wilmington Packet. Indeed, the next executive claims settlement agreement
came over a quarter-century later, in 1825, and settled claims for vessels,
cargo, loss of profit, damages, and injuries to the crew arising out of the capture of four American ships by Venezuelan brigs of war between 1817 and
1821.162

Executive claims settlements became more frequent after 1825; 24 were
concluded between 1825 and 1850.163 All resolved relatively discrete mari-

by these, for the said sum, is renounced to the above mentioned Committee without reserve, with
the promise to validate this renunciation in all times.
Letter from W.V. Murray to the Committee of Affairs on the Colonies of the Batavian Republic in America and the Coast of Guinea, Jan. 19, 1800, reprintedin 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 1078.
159. Letter from M. Van der Goes to W.V. Murray, Nov. 18, 1799, reprinted in 5 MILLER, supra note
153, at 1097.
160. Privateers were licensed by a country at war "to capture vessels of an enemy country" and "would
obtain title to the seized property, ship, and cargo, through judicial condemnation carried out by an
admiralty court near the locale of the capture." William R. Casto, The Origins of FederalAdmiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers,Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 124 (1993) (discussing
the national security implications of this licensing system).
161. Prize courts have jurisdiction only over prizes taken by their own privateers; thus, only a Dutch
prize court would have had jurisdiction to decide whether the prize was lawful. See Bradford R. Clark,
FederalCommon Law: A StructuralReinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1333-36 (1996).
162. CONVENTION FOR ADJUSTING CERTAIN CLAIMS, U.S.-Colom., Mar. 16, 1825, reprinted in 3
MILLER, supra note 153, at 195-99.
163. See CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "MORRIS," U.S.-Ecuador,
Feb. 9, 1850, reprinted in 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 665-69; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE CLAIM ARISING OUT OF THE SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF THE BRIG "MOUNT VERNON,"

Venez., July 7, 1849, reprinted in 5

MILLER, supra note

153, at 587-90;

SETTLEMENT OF THE CASES OF THE BRIG "JOSEPHINE" AND THE SCHOONER "RANGER,"

June 15, 1849, reprintedin 5

MILLER,

supra note 153, at 581-85;

U.S.-

CONVENTION FOR THE FINAL

U.S.-Ecuador,

CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT
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time disputes,' 64 none appear to have terminated claims cognizable in U.S.
courts, and in all cases the conduct complained of was conduct of either the
government itself or parties closely linked to the government (particularly
privateers).165 Of the 31 executive claims settlement agreements concluded

OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "NATIVE," U.S.-New Gran., Apr. 25, 1848, reprinted in 5 MILLER, supra note

153, at 437-43; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "SARAH WILSON,"
U.S.-Venez., Apr. 12, 1848, reprinted in 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 429-35; CONVENTION FOR THE
FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "JOSEPHINE," U.S.-Venez., Nov. 16, 1846, reprintedin 5
MILLER, supra note 153, at 109-13; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG
"NATIVE," U.S.-Venez., Nov. 16, 1846, reprintedin 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 103-08; CONVENTION
FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "JOSEPHINE," U.S.-New Gran., May 16, 1846,
in 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 813-15 (Hunter Miller ed., 1934); SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., Nov. 10-26, 1845, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 779-90; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE SEIZURE OF THE SCHOONER "YANKEE," U.S.-New Gran.,

Mar. 29, 1845, reprinted in 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 741-49; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "MORRIS," U.S.-New Gran., Nov. 5, 1844, reprinted in 4 MILLER, supra note
153, at 663-69; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM ARISING OUT OF THE LOSS OF
PART OF THE CARGO OF THE SCHOONER "HENRIETTA," U.S.-New Gran., Apr. 22, 1844, reprinted in 4
MILLER, supra note 153, at 555-58; ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG
"MORIuS," U.S.-Venez., Feb. 26-Mar. 1, 1844, reprinted in 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 523-28; CONVENTION FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE CLAIM FOR THE DETENTION AND SEIZURE OF THE SCHOONER

"JOHN S. BRYAN," U.S.-Braz., June 12, 1843, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 507-14; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE CONFISCATION OF PART OF THE
CARGO OF THE SCHOONER "By CHANCE," U.S.-New Gran., Feb. 9, 1843, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra
note 153, at 499-506; ORAL AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "WAR-

RIOR," U.S.-Chile, Dec. 10, 1840, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 325-28; ORAL AGREEMENT
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE FIRST CASE OF THE BRIG "MACEDONIAN," U.S.-Chile, July 7, 1840,
reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 287-93; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM FOR THE SHIP "MARY"
AND HER CARGO, U.S.-Neth., Mar. 25, 1839, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 179-87; AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Port., Jan. 19, 1832, reprintedin 3 MILLER, supra note
153, at 653-69; CONVENTION FOR ADJUSTING CERTAIN CLAIMS, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 25, 1829, reprinted
in 3 MILLER, supra note 153, at 523-30; CONFIRMATION OF THIRTEEN CLAIMS AGREEMENTS AND OF
AN AGREEMENT REGARDING THE RATE OF EXCHANGE, U.S.-Braz., June 15, 1829, reprinted in 3
MILLER, supra note 153, at 485-505; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS FOR THE BRIG "HECTOR" AND THE
SHIP "COMMERCE," U.S.-Russ., Mar. 17, 1828, reprintedin 3 MILLER, supra note 153, at 421-25; ExCHANGE OF NOTES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM IN THE CASE OF THE BRIG "PEARL," U.S.Russ., Apr. 19-22, 1825, reprinted in 3 MILLER, supra note 153, at 201-07. Although 24 separate agreements were negotiated, they do not represent claims arising out of 24 separate incidents. For example,
five of the agreements deal with claims related to the BrigJosephine, four deal with claims related to the
Brig Morris, and two deal with claims related to the Brig Native.
164. There are some arguable exceptions to this. See SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov.
10-26, 1845, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 779-90 (settling a long-standing tariff dispute
under a treaty between the two countries); CONFIRMATION OF THIRTEEN CLAIMS AGREEMENTS AND OF
AN AGREEMENT REGARDING THE RATE OF EXCHANGE, LI.S.-Braz., June 15, 1829, reprinted in 3
MILLER, supra note 153, at 485-505 (settling a number of disputes).
165. Some claims during this period were resolved by treaties. See, e.g., CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Ecuador, Nov. 25, 1862, reprintedin 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 869-82
(resolving claims of American citizens against the government of Ecuador); CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-New Gran., Sept. 10, 1857, reprintedin 7 MILLER, Supra note 153, at 661705 (resolving claims of American citizens for property damage arising out of riots in Panama); GADSDEN
TREATY, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, reprintedin 6 MILLER, supra note 153, at 293-437 (resolving claims arising
out of war); TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Feb. 8, 1853,
reprintedin 6 MILLER, supra note 153, at 111-67 (resolving claims against the governments of both nations); CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Braz., Jan. 27, 1849, reprintedin 5 MILLER,
upra note 153, at 125-31; TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PERU, U.S.-Peru, Mar. 17,
1841, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 329-48 (resolving confiscation of Unites States ships and
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between 1851 and 1863,166 eight involved the resolution of claims by foreign governments against the United States for international maritime incitheir cargo); TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, U.S.-Rep. of Tex.,
Apr. 11, 1838, reprintedin 4 MILLER, supra note 153, at 125-31 (resolving claims arising from the Texan
seizure of the Brigs Pocket and Durango); TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND DENMARK, U.S.Den, Mar. 28, 1830, reprintedin 3 MILLER, supra note 153, at 531-40 (resolving claims against the gov-

ernments of both nations); TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19,
1794, reprintedin 2 MILLER, supra note 153, at 245-74 (resolving claims arising out of war).
166. SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH BARK "SYMMETRY," U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 3-July 10,
1863, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 933-38; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE FRENCH
STEAMER "TAGE," U.S.-Fr., Dec. 30, 1862-Feb. 18, 1863, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 90713; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH SCHOONER "ELLEN," U.S.-Gr. Brit., Dec. 1, 1862-June
20, 1863, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 883-88; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE NORWEGIAN BARK "ADMIRAL PETER TORDENSKJOLD," U.S.-Nor., June 11-12, 1862, reprinted in 8 MILLER,
supra note 153, at 821-32; AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF
THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF THE DANISH BARK "JURGEN LORENTZEN," U.S.-Den.,

Feb. 19, 1862, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 707-16; AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO
ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH BRIG "JULES ET MARIE,"

U.S.-Fr., Jan. 17-24, 1862, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 691-705; AGREEMENT FOR THE
SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF THE
SPANISH BARK "PROVIDENCIA," U.S.-Spain, Dec. 19-20, 1861, reprintedin 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at

681-89; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF HENRY C.J. HEUSKEN, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 26, 1861, reprinted in 8
MILLER, supra note 153, at 635-45; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH SHIP "PERTHSHIRE,"
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Oct. 11 and 24, 1861, reprintedin 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 607-14; SETTLEMENT OF
THE CLAIM OF JOHN N. COBB, U.S.-Chile, Mar. 9-14, 1861, reprinted in 8 MILLER, upra note 153, at
585-89; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF GEORGE W. JOHNSTON, U.S.-Venez.,
Oct. 18, 1860, reprintedin 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 577-83; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF WALTER
DICKSON, U.S.-Turk., July 18, 1860, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 519-32; SETTLEMENT OF
THE CLAIMS OF HEMENWAY & CO. AND ALSOP & Co., U.S.-Chile, Jan. 16-28, 1860, reprinted in 8
MILLER, supra note 153, at 449-57; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF EDWARD NEWTON PERKINS, U.S.Papal States, June 24-Aug. 2, 1859, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at 267-80; SETTLEMENT OF
THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN BARK "MERMAID," U.S.-China, Oct. 26-Nov. 1, 1858, reprinted in 8
MILLER, supra note 153, at 13-20; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN WHALING SHIP "FRANKLIN," U.S.-Chile, Sept. 10, 1858, reprinted in 8 MILLER, supra note 153, at
3-11; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "HORATIO," U.S.-Venez., Feb.
27, 1858, reprintedin 7 MILLER, supra note 153, at 727-32; AGREEMENT FOR A MIXED COMMISSION IN
THE CASE OF THE WHALING SHIP "GEORGE HOWLAND," U.S.-Ecuador, Nov. 13, 1857, reprinted in 7
MILLER, supra note 153, at 707-12; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "ESMERALDA," U.S.-Fr.,
June 10-Dec. 26, 1857, reprinted in 7 MILLER, supra note 153, at 591-94; AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OFJOHN ADAMS, U.S.-Peru, June 4, 1857, reprintedin 7 MILLER, supra note 153,
at 587-90; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF AMERICAN SHIPMASTERS AT THE CHINCHA ISLANDS, U.S.Peru, Apr. 8-9, 1857, reprintedin 7 MILLER, supra note 153, at 503-18; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF
STEPHEN H. WEEMS, U.S.-Guat., Oct. 26-29, 1855, reprinted in 7 MILLER, supra note 153, at 325-28;
ENGAGEMENT TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS, U.S.-Fiji, Oct. 23, 1855, reprinted in 7 MILLER, supra note
153, at 283-324; ADJUSTMENT OF THE DILLON CASE, U.S.-Fr., Aug. 3-7, 1855, id. at 147-222; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF JOHN B. PHILLIPS AND GEORGE M. EICHELBERGER, U.S.-Switz., Mar. 9Apr. 12, 1855, reprinted in 7 MILLER, supra note 153, at 113-20; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE
STEAMER "BLACK WARRIOR," U.S.-Spain, Feb. 21-June 28, 1855, reprinted in 7 MILLER, supra note 153,
at 31-111; CONVENTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS FROM THE VENEZUELAN "LEY DE ESPERA,"
U.S.-Venez., June 1, 1853, reprinted in 6 MILLER, supra note 153, at 197-209; CONVENTION FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "NATIVE," U.S.-Ecuador, Feb. 5, 1853, reprintedin 6 MILLER,
supra note 153, at 105-09; AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF SAMUEL FRANKLIN
TRACY, U.S.-Peru, Aug. 6, 1852, reprinted in 6 MILLER, supra note 153, at 59-73; SETTLEMENT OF THE
CLAIM OF ZIMMERMANN, FRAZIER & CO., U.S.-Uru., June 23-24, 1852, reprinted in 6 MILLER, supra
note 153, at 45-58; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASES OF THE SCHOONER "ECONOMY," THE SCHOONER "BEN ALAM," AND THE VESSELS "SAN JOSE," "CARLOTA," AND "GERTRUDIS,"
U.S.-Venez., May 1, 1852, reprintedin 5 MILLER, supra note 153, at 1063-73.
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dents related to the civil war. 167 In the first five of these cases, Congress appropriated the funds to pay the claims;1 68 but in the last three cases the
money came directly out of the budget of the Navy Department.169 Seventeen of the remaining claims dealt with the damage to or seizure of property
abroad or the false imprisonment of U.S. citizens.170 Others include settlement of a diplomatic spat resulting from a U.S. subpoena served on a French

167. SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH BARK "SYMMETRY," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT
OF THE CASE OF THE FRENCH STEAMER "TAGE," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE
BRITISH SCHOONER "ELLEN," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE NORWEGIAN BARK
"ADMIRAL PETER TORDENSKJOLD," supra note 166; AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION
OF THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH BRIG "JULES ET MARIE," supra note 166;
AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF THE SPANISH BARK "PROVIDENCIA," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE
OF THE BRITISH SHIP "PERTHSHIRE," supra note 166.

168. With congressional approval, these agreements could be classified as congressional-executive,
rather than sole executive agreements. See, e.g., SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE NORWEGIAN BARK
"ADMIRAL PETER TORDENSKJOLD," supra note 166; AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION
OF THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF THE DANISH BARK "JURGEN
LORENTZEN," supra note 166; AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION
OF LIABILITY IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH BRIG "JULES ET MARIE," supra note 166; AGREEMENT FOR
THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF
THE SPANISH BARK "PROVIDENCIA," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH SHIP
"PERTHSHIRE," supra note 166.
169. SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH BARK "SYMMETRY," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT
OF THE CASE OF THE FRENCH STEAMER "TAGE," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE

BRITISH SCHOONER "ELLEN," supra note 166. It is unclear why, in these cases, money was not sought
directly from Congress. Neither the amount of money involved, nor the other country involved can fully
explain the difference. In the case of the Perthshire, for example, Congress appropriated the $1,000, see
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRITISH SHIP "PERTHSHIRE," supra note 166, at 614, but in the case
of the British Schooner Ellen, the Navy Department paid the $4,123.50 directly, see SETTLEMENT OF THE
CASE OF THE BRITISH SCHOONER "ELLEN," supra note 166, at 888. With reference to the Providencia
claim the Secretary of the Navy wrote that the Navy had no funds under its control from which the
award could be made. AGREEMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE
AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY IN THE CASE OF THE SPANISH BARK "PROVIDENCIA,"

supra note 166, at 688.

Perhaps such a fund was established because the early agreements (until the Ellen in December 1862)
were paid by funds sought form Congress and the later agreements were paid directly out of the Navy
budget.
170. CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF GEORGE W.
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF WALTER DICKSON, supra note
WARD NEWTON PERKINS, supra note

JOHNSTON, supra note 166;

SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF ED-

166; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE

AMERICAN WHALING SHIP "FRANKLIN,"
BRIG "HORATIO," supra note

166;

supra note 166; CONVENTION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE

166; AGREEMENT FOR A MIXED COMMISSION IN THE CASE OF THE WHAL-

ING SHIP "GEORGE HOWLAND," supra note 166; AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF
JOHN ADAMS,
ISLANDS,

supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF AMERICAN SHIPMASTERS AT THE CHINCHA
166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS OF STEPHEN H. WEEMS, supra note 166;

supra note

AGREEMENT TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS, WITH OTHER PROMISES, supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE
CLAIM OF JOHN B. PHILLIPS AND GEORGE

M. EICHELBERGER, supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE
166; CONVENTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS

CASE OF THE STEAMER "BLACK WARRIOR," supra note

ARISING FROM THE VENEZUELAN "LEY DE ESPERA," supra note 166; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLE-

166; AGREEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF ZIMMER-

MENT OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "NATIVE," supra note
THE CLAIM OF SAMUEL FRANKLIN TRACY, supra note

MANN, FRAZIER & Co., supra note 166; CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CASES OF THE
SCHOONER "ECONOMY" AND THE SCHOONER "BEN ALAN" AND THE VESSELS "SAN JOSE," "CARLOTA,"
AND "GERTRUDIS," supra note

166.
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consul in the United States,1 7' compensation to the family of an American
diplomat assassinated in Japan, 72 restitution for excess customs duties
charged to American merchants in Chile, 173 and payments for damages to
174
ships caused by accidental collisions at sea.
Between 1863 and 1918 at least five claims were directly resolved by executive agreement. Each claim involved a U.S. merchant or merchant vessel
claiming damage or loss of property against a foreign government.175 During this same time, however, the President entered into more than twenty
6
sole executive agreements that referred claims to arbitration commissions.17
171. ADJUSTMENT OF THE DILLON CASE, supra note 166.
172. SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF HENRY C.J. HEUSKEN, supra note 166.
173. SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF JOHN N. COBB, supra note 166; SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS
OF HEMENWAY AND CO., AND ALSOp AND CO., supra note 166.
174. SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN BARK "MERMAID," supra note 166; SETTLEMENT
OF THE CASE OF THE BRIG "ESMERALDA," supra note 166.
175. CLAIMS: THE CASE OF AF. JAURETT, U.S.-Venez., Feb. 13, 1909, 12 Bevans 1104; CLAIMS: THE
CASES OF CHARLES W. RENTON AND JACOB BAIZ, U.S.-Hond., Nov. 25, 1904, 8 Bevans 888-89;
CLAIMS: PAYMENTS OF DUTIES TO REBEL CHIEFS, U.S.-Nicar., Apr. 29, 1899, 10 Bevans 351-52; ADJUSTMENT OF THE CLAIM OF PATRICK SHIELDS, U.S.-Chile, May 24, 1897, reprinted in 1 TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER POWERS, 1776-1909, at 190 (William H. Malloy ed., 1910) [hereinafter MALLOY];
AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE CLAIMS IN THE CASE OF THE STEAMER "VIRGINIUS," U.S.-Spain, Feb. 27,
1875, reprintedin 2 MALLOY, supra, at 1664-65.
176. AGREEMENT FOR SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES ON
ACCOUNT OF WRONGS AND INJURIES COMMITTED BY AUTHORITIES OF SPAIN IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA,

U.S.-Spain, Feb. 11-12, 1871, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1661-64; PROTOCOL OF AN
AGREEMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO AN ARBITRATOR OF THE CLAIMS OF ANTONIO PELLETIER AND A.H.
LAZARE AGAINST HAYTI, U.S.-Haiti, May 28, 1884, reprintedin 1 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 932-34;
PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT FOR SUBMISSION

TO AND ARBITRATOR OF THE CLAIM OF CHARLES

ADRIEN VAN BOKKELEN, U.S.-Haiti, May 24, 1888, reprintedin 1 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 935-36;
PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND PORTUGAL IN REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION CLAIMS AGAINST PORTUGAL, June 13, 1891, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 146062; PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CLAIMS OF OBERLANDER AND MESSENGER, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 2, 1897,
reprintedin 1 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1180-81; ARBITRATION OF "OZAMA BRIDGE" CLAIM, U.S.Dom. Rep., Mar. 5-8, 1898, 7 Bevans 183; PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT FOR THE ARBITRATION OF
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED IN FAVOR OF VICTOR H. MACCORD, U.S.-Peru, May 17,
1898, reprintedin 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1443-44; SUPPLEMENTAL PROTOCOL: CLAIM OF VICTOR
H. MACCORD, U.S.-Peru, June 6, 1898, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, 1444-45; PROTOCOL OF
AN AGREEMENT FOR THE ARBITRATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE LIABILITY AND AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED JOHN D. METZGER AND CO., U.S.-Haiti, Oct. 18, 1899, reprinted in 1 MALLOY,
supra note

175, at 936-38; PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT FOR THE ARBITRATION OF THE AMOUNT OF

THE CLAIM OF ROBERT H.

MAY AGAINST GUATEMALA AND THE CLAIM OF GUATEMALA AGAINST SAID

MAY, U.S.-Guat., Feb. 23, 1900, reprinted in 1 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 871-73; PROTOCOL OF AN
AGREEMENT FOR THE ARBITRATION OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED ORR AND
LAUBENHEIMER AND THE POST-GLOVER ELECTRIC CO., U.S.-Nicar., Mar. 22, 1900, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1290-92; CLAIMS PROTOCOL SUBMITTING TO ARBITRATION THE CLAIMS OF THE
"C. H.WHITE," AND "KATE AND ANNA," AND THE WHALING
BARK "CAPE HORN PIGEON," U.S.-Russ., Aug. 26, 1900, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, Supra note 175, at
1532-34; PROTOCOL FOR THE ARBITRATION OF CERTAIN CLAIMS AGAINST SALVADOR, U.S.-El Sal.,
SCHOONERS "JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS,"

Dec. 19, 1901, reprintedin 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1568-70; ARBITRATION OF SALA CLAIM, U.S.Dom. Rep., Apr. 28, 1902, 7 Bevans 184-88; PROTOCOL SUBMITTING TO ARBITRATION THE CLAIM OF
GEORGE C. BENNER ET AL., U.S.-Braz., Sept. 6, 1902, reprintedin 1 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 152-54;
ARBITRATION PROTOCOL-CLAIM OF SAN DOMINGO IMPROVEMENT CO., U.S.-Dom. Rep, Jan. 31,
1903, reprinted in 1 MALLOY, upra note 175, at 414-18; PROTOCOL WITH VENEZUELA SUBMITTING TO
ARBITRATION CLAIMS AGAINST VENEZUELA, U.S.-Venez., Feb. 17, 1903, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra
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These agreements resolved, through arbitration, claims against states. Sometimes the parties complained of private conduct, but the key to recovery was
proving state responsibility for such conduct. None of the arbitration
agreements contemplate the settlement of claims against private parties,
much less the settlement of any such claims actually cognizable in U.S.
courts.
This first century of practice shows that the claims settlement power was
used infrequently by the executive branch until 1825, and that even until
1850 all such agreements dealt with maritime disputes with foreign sovereigns, often over the conduct of the privateers they licensed. The second half
of the nineteenth century saw an increase in the use of arbitration commissions set up through sole executive agreement. The claims funneled through
these commissions, however, remained claims against foreign sovereigns
and/or their agents. To the extent that claims against even nominally private
parties (like the privateers) were resolved, there is no evidence that such
claims were cognizable-much less pending-in U.S. courts.
4. Reparationsand Other War-Related Claims Settlement Agreements
The best support for sole executive authority to nullify the World War IIrelated claims probably comes from post-World War II reparations agreements. These agreements, however, address conduct committed in conjunction with, or at the behest of, foreign governments. Executive branch settlements of reparations issues have never explicitly precluded private claims
against private parties. Treaties, on the other hand, have done so.
War has provided the context for a number of significant sole executive
agreements, including two particularly well-known agreements from World
War II: the bases-for-destroyers agreement of 1940,177 and the agreement
between allied governments at Yalta at the close of World War 11.178 In the
claims settlement context, executive agreements have been used to settle
war-related debts owed by foreign governments to the U.S. government,

note 175, at 1870-72; CLAIMS PROTOCOL SUBMITTING TO ARBITRATION THE CLAIMS OF THE ORINOCO
STEAMSHIP COMPANY AND THE U.S. AND VENEZUELA Co., U.S.-Venez, Feb. 13, 1909, reprinted in 2
MALLOY, supra note 175, at 1881-87; PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIM OF
THE UNITED STATES AND VENEZUELA Co., U.S.-Venez., Aug. 21, 1909, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra
note 175, at 1887-89; PROTOCOL AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE

CLAIM OF THE ORINOCO CO., U.S.-Venez., Sept. 9, 1909, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 175, at
1889-92; CLAIMS: THE CASE OF GEORGE D. EMERY CO., U.S.-Nicar., May 25, 1909, 10 Bevans 36573; ARBITRATION THE ALSOP CLAIM, U.S.-Chile, Dec. 1, 1909, 6 Bevans 548-49; CLAIMS: DAMAGES
CAUSED BY RIOT, U.S.-Pan., Nov. 27, 1915, 10 Bevans 712-13. For more examples, see CRANDALL,
supra note 71, at 108-11. This is a marked change from the pre-1870 period when agreements that
referred claims to arbitration commissions were submitted to the Senate for approval. See Bassett, supra
note 77, at 77.
177. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN RESPECTING NAVAL AND

AIR BASES, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 2405.
178. REPORT SIGNED AT CRIMEA (YALTA) CONFERENCE, Feb. 11, 1945, 59 Stat. 1823.

HeinOnline -- 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. 27 2003

HarvardInternationalLawJournal / Vol. 44
frequently with the blessing of Congress. 7 9 In a more limited capacity, sole
executive agreements have also dealt with reparations for private parties.
The fate of claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments for warrelated injuries and damages has frequently been determined by treaty.180 In
an 1801 treaty with France, for example, the U.S. government renounced
claims on behalf of its nationals for attacks on commerce, in exchange for
French renunciation of its claims against the United States for treaty violations. 8 Following the War of 1812, U.S. officials pushed for compensation
to its nationals for capture by the British of their ships and goods, but the
British successfully resisted the effort and the Treaty of Ghent did not include such reparations. 82 Instead, Congress provided some relief to the injured Americans. 183 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the MexicanAmerican war gave New Mexico and California to the United States in return for $15 million and the assumption of payment of certain claims by
U.S. nationals against Mexico. 84 Again, Congress enacted a law providing
for the payments. The treaty ending the Spanish-American War renounced
all claims by citizens of either country against the government of the other,
and once more Congress undertook to compensate U.S. nationals with legitimate claims against Spain that had been bargained away.' 85
World War I reparations claims by the United States against Germany
were resolved by a 1921 bilateral treaty signed in Berlin ("Treaty of Berlin"). 186 It included by incorporation reparations-related provisions from the
Treaty of Versailles, which was not ratified by the United States Senate. 187
An executive agreement between Germany and the United States in 1922

179. Following World War I, President Wilson negotiated agreements for the resolution of debts
owed both by Germany and the Allies to the United States. Congress criticized President Wilson's decision to permit postponement of scheduled payments by the Allies and subsequently passed a statute
creating a commission to renegotiate the Allied debt. A debt-restructuring agreement negotiated with
Great Britain exceeded the commission's authority, so the commission requested congressional approval.
Congress then amended the statute to permit ex post approval to future debt agreements. See Ackerman
& Golove, supra note 34, at 838-40. Both the lend-lease and the war debt agreements resolved claims of
the United States government with the ultimate approval of Congress.
180. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE WAR CLAIMS COMMISSION WITH RESPECT TO
WAR CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF WORLD WAR 11,H.R. Doc. No. 83-67, at 64-91 (Jan. 16, 1953) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE WAR CLAIMS COMMISSION). The Jay Treaty from 1794
resolved a variety of claims, including debts owed by Americans to British citizens, which U.S. courts
refused to honor, and the claims of U.S. citizens that British privateers involved in the war against France
had improperly captured American vessels and other property. THE JAY TREATY, arts. 6, 7, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
Nov. 19, 1794, reprintedin 2 MILLER, supra note 153, at 245.
181. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE WAR CLAIMS COMMISSION, supra note 180, at 66-67. In an
agreement with Spain in 1819, both Spain and the United States relinquished claims for damages their
citizens had suffered; Congress provided some compensation to the injured U.S. nationals. Id. at 73.
182. Id. at 69-70.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 74-75.
185. Id. at 79-81.
186. TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, U.S.-Germany, Aug. 25,
1921, 42 Star. 1939.
187. Id. arts. I, II.
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established the Mixed Claims Commission to resolve, among other issues,
claims by American citizens for damage to their properties and rights within
German territory, other claims suffered by the United States or its nationals
as a result of the war, and debts owed to American citizens by the German
government or German nationals. 8 8s These categories of claims had been
secured to the United States through the Treaty of Berlin; the Mixed Claims
Commission was established to make the actual awards. The commission
made detailed decisions about the types of claims covered by the agreement,
which included American civilian forced labor claims and the mistreatment
of prisoners of war. 18 9
An argument for sole executive power to resolve private claims in reparations agreements might rest on the Potsdam Agreement, signed August 2,
1945,190 and the follow-up agreement concluded in Paris in January 1946.' 91
As an initial matter, both agreements were concluded within months of the
end of the war, and neither was contemplated as a comprehensive Peace
Treaty, perhaps giving the President some claim to authority under the
Commander-in-Chief power which would not extend to later agreements.
The Potsdam Agreement provides that "[t]he reparation claims of the
United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German
external assets."'' 92 On the one hand, this language makes no mention of
individual claims. On the other hand, the term "reparations" may be read
broadly enough to cover war-related harm to individuals inflicted by either
the foreign government or private parties working in concert with such governments. As used in the Treaty of Versailles, the term "reparations" included claims of injury to individuals and their property, but did not explic193
itly include injury inflicted by private parties.
The Potsdam Agreement also provided for the dismantling of German
industry, including the "complete disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could

188. AGREEMENT FOR A MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID BY
GERMANY IN SATISFACTION OF GERMANY'S FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY CONCLUDED
BETWEEN THE 'Two GOVERNMENTS ON AUGUST 25, 1921, art. I, U.S.-Germany, Aug. 10, 1922, 42
Stat. 2200.
189. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE WAR CLAIMS COMMISSION, supra note 180, at 169.
190. PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS APPROVED AT BERLIN (POTSDAM), Aug. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1207
[hereinafter POTSDAM AGREEMENT].
191. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS RESPECTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN REPARATION, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157 [hereinafter PARIS
REPARATIONS AGREEMENT).

192. POTSDAM AGREEMENT, supra note 190, § 111.3.
193. The Treaty of Versailles provided that Germany would "make compensation for all damage done
to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of

the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by
sea and from the air." TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY (TREATY OF VERSAILLES), art. 232, June 28,

1919-Jan. 10, 1920, 2 Bevans 43.
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be used for military production."'1 94 In other words, whatever the precise
meaning of the term "reparations," as a practical matter potential German
corporate defendants would likely be under allied control, lack the assets to
satisfy any potential judgment, or no longer exist. Plaintiffs bringing slave
and forced labor claims in U.S. courts against German corporate defendants
have conceded that the Potsdam Agreement resolved claims against private
entities as well as the German state, since it provided for the seizure of pri1 95
vate industrial assets.
The Allies negotiated another multinational agreement governing reparations in Paris in 1946,196 also concluded by the United States as a sole executive agreement. It divided up Germany's industrial property among the
allies, and established that each signatory's shares of reparations under the
agreement covered "all claims and those of its nationals against the former
German Government and its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature,
arising out of the war."' 97 As with the Potsdam Agreement, it seems
difficult as a practical matter to reconcile this division of industrial property
with private litigation against the companies whose property was being di198
vided by the Allies.
The Paris Reparations Agreement nonetheless rather carefully excludes
from its scope at least some claims against German nationals. It does not
oblige the German government to secure the discharge of claims "against
Germany and German nationals arising out of contracts and other obligations
entered into . . . before the existence of a state of war between Germany and
Signatory Government concerned."' 99 Thus, the agreement explicitly distinguishes between claims directed against German agencies and those directed
against German nationals; it purports to settle the former, but excludes some
of the latter. The Paris Reparations Agreement also refers to claims between
persons entitled to protection by a signatory government against nationals of
any other signatory government with respect to property received by that
government as reparations.200 The agreement does not purport to waive or
extinguish such claims, but instead pledges that each signatory government
will neither assert such claims in international tribunals, nor give diplomatic support to such claims.20 Finally, the Paris Reparations Agreement
does not purport to finally resolve the "total amount of all reparation to be
'20 2
made by Germany.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

POTSDAM AGREEMENT, supra note 190, § lI.A.3(i).
Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 277 (D.N.J. 1999).
PARIS REPARATIONS AGREEMENT, supra note 191.
Id. art. 2.A (emphasis added).
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449 (D.N.J. 1999).
PARIS REPARATIONS AGREEMENT, supra note 191, art. 2.C(i) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
Id.
PARIS REPARATIONS AGREEMENT, supra note 191, art. 2.B(i).
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Other agreements from the same period also distinguish between claims
against governments and claims against nationals, further suggesting that
the resolution of claims against German governmental "Agencies" was not
synonymous with the resolution of claims against German "nationals." The
Treaty of Peace with Japan, for example, purports to waive claims by U.S.
nationals against Japanese nationals of its own force,20 3 just as treaties with
Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary explicitly purport to waive claims by nationals of those countries against German nationals. 20 4 All of these agreements were concluded by the United States as treaties.
Tensions with the Soviet Union during the early 1950s resulted in rene20 5
gotiated reparations agreements in 1952 (the "Transition Agreement")
20 6
and 1953 (the "London Debt Agreement").
Both were concluded as treaties. The western allied powers, meeting in Bonn in 1952, agreed to defer
Germany's payment of reparations in hopes of promoting the growth of the
German economy. The agreement provides, in part, that "[tihe problem of
reparation shall be settled by the peace treaty between Germany and its former enemies or by earlier agreements concerning this matter."20 7 The Transition Agreement obligated Germany to pass legislation to compensate per20 8
sons who were persecuted by the Nazis and suffered injury or damages.
Pursuant to this agreement, Germany implemented extensive domestic programs to compensate victims of the Nazis, but the programs excluded many
claimants and certain types of claims-including claims for forced and slave
labor. 20 9 The parties to the Transition Agreement resolved "that they will at
no time assert any claim for reparation against the current production of the
203. TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45. Article 14 provides the terms of Japanese payment "for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war." Id. art.
14(a). Article 14 further provides that
[eixcept as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims
of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions
taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied
Powers for direct military costs of occupation.
Id. art. 14(b) (emphasis added).
204. For example, the Treaty of Peace with Romania provides that
[wjithout prejudice to these and to any other dispositions in favour of Roumania and Roumanian
nationals by the Powers occupying Germany, Roumania waives on its own behalf and on behalf of
Roumanian nationals all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8,
1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired,
before September 1, 1939. This waiver shall be deemed to include debts, all inter-governmental
claims in respect of arrangements entered into in the course of the war and all claims for loss or
damage arising during the war.
TREATY OF PEACE WITH ROUMANIA, art. 28.4, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1757, 42 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis
added). See also TREATY OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA, art. 26.4, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1915, 41 U.N.T.S.
21; TREATY OF PEACE WITH HUNGARY, art. 30.4, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 2065,41 U.N.T.S. 135.
205. CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF MATTERS ARISING OUT OF THE WAR AND THE OCCUPATION, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter TRANSITION AGREEMENT).
206. AGREEMENT ON GERMAN EXTERNAL DEBTS, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter LONDON DEBT AGREEMENT].

207. TRANSITION AGREEMENT, supra note 205, ch. 6, art. 1.1.
208. Id. ch. 4.
209. Burger-Fischer,65 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
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Federal Republic." 210 The London Debt Agreement was designed to "remove
obstacles to normal economic relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and other countries. '211 It used language taken directly from the
Paris Reparations Agreement to exclude from the treaty "consideration of
claims arising out of the second World War by countries which were at war
or occupied by Germany during that war, and by nationals of such countries,.
against the Reich and agencies of the Reich," which were "deferred until the
' 212
final settlement of the problem of reparation."
This series of agreements provides only weak and limited support for sole
executive authority to settle claims against private parties, even in the context of reparations. 213 The London Debt Agreement and the Transition
Agreement were treaties, ratified by the Senate. Courts holding that slave
labor claims were subsumed by post-War agreements have relied largely
upon these two treaties. 214 The Potsdam and Paris Reparations Agreements
were concluded as sole executive agreements, and their effect, as discussed
above, was to appropriate for the Allies the German industrial assets, leaving
private industry nothing from which to pay reparations. This effect, though,
is not the same thing as nullifying claims cognizable in U.S. courts; instead,
2 15
it simply leaves no potential defendants for such suits.
Significantly, the language of neither agreement explicitly resolves claims
against private parties. The Potsdam Agreement uses the term "reparations,"
while the Paris Reparations Agreement terminates claims against German
"Agencies," not nationals. Several treaties, on the other hand, do explicitly
resolve claims against "nationals." Finally, both the Potsdam and Paris
Reparations Agreements were signed shortly after the end of hostilities, providing, perhaps, some authority for the President to conclude them under
the Commander-in-Chief power.

210. TRANSITION AGREEMENT, supra note 205, ch. 6., art.1.
211. LONDON DEBT AGREEMENT, supra note 206, pmbl.
212. Id. art. 5(2).
213. See generally Boyd, supra note 40, at 298-303 (arguing that "negotiated war reparations" differ
from judicial remedies "in motive and purpose, in nature and type, and in the source of law defining
each").
214. Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 278; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 483. These opinions, however,
are not entirely consistent. The lwanowa court concluded that article 2.A of the Paris Reparations
Agreement bars claims against German agencies (including slave and forced labor claims against private
parties), but that article 5(2) of the London Debt Agreement deferred such claims. The court resolved
this "irreconcilable conflict" by concluding that the London Debt Agreement superseded the earlier Paris
Reparations Agreement. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 460. It held that plaintiffs' claims were barred based
on the London Debt Agreement because that agreement contemplated only government-to-government
claim resolution. Id. at 483. The Burger-Fischer court, on the other hand, concluded that the Transition
Agreement was "finalized" after the London Debt Agreement and therefore did not modify its terms, and
that the plaintiffs were limited to the remedies provided by the Transition Agreement, which subsumed
private claims. Burger-Fischer,65 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79. The conclusion that the Transition and/or the
London Debt Agreements-both treaties-nullified private claims has little bearing on the argument
that the President cannot nullify such claims through a sole executive agreement, except to highlight
that many treaties do so, while virtually no sole executive agreements do.
215. Cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 79, at 264 n.125.
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As a general assertion of sole executive authority over private claimseven ones related to the second World War-this series of agreements fails,
particularly in light of the explicit language resolving national-national litigation found in some treaties. The executive agreements related to German
reparations do provide, however, some limited precedent for the settlement
through sole executive agreement of claims against "Agencies" of the German government (the language used in the Paris Reparations Agree-ment). As
courts have noted, German courts have relied on the negotiating history of
the London Debt Agreement to conclude that this language includes claims
216
against private companies for forced or slave labor during the war.
Accepting this reading, 2 17 one might argue that the Potsdam and Paris
Reparations Agreements establish that the executive branch has the power,
at least in the context of immediate post-war reparations agreements, to
conclude agreements that define certain conduct by nominally private actors
as government conduct, and to resolve claims against those entities through
a sole executive agreement. 218 This argument has particular force with respect to slave and forced labor claims, in part because there is German
precedent for the proposition that the Transition Agreement included such
claims with the "Agencies," and in part because the distinction between
public and private conduct is particularly muddled when the forced laborers
involved were captured and transported by the German government, and
then used by German industry to produce armaments and other war-related
goods for the German government.2 1 9
However, this argument proves too much. 220 The recent executive agreements with Germany and France, in fact, include a broad spectrum of claims

216. lwanowa, 67 F Supp. 2d at 454.
217. On the one hand, this reading is entirely plausible given the purpose of the London Debt
Agreement to permit the economic recovery of German industry; on the other hand, Germany has a
strong incentive to read the agreement this way.
218. One might buttress this argument with the observation that reparations issues have historically
been resolved through government-to-government negotiations, and that claims related to slave/forced
labor and other wartime atrocities fall within the traditional definition of reparations or "war damage."
See generally Armin Steinkamm, War Damages, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
1354 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 2000). But such issues have traditionally been resolved through peace
treaties, ratified by the Senate.
219. See, e.g., Nazi Era Cases, 129 E Supp. 2d 370, 375-76 (D.N.J. 2001) (reasoning that although
the "[p]laintiff almost certainly was enslaved by a private company, as opposed to the Nazi government
or German military, one need only look to the labor [plaintiff) Frumkin was forced to perform (construction of a military airbase) to see that Holzmann's abuse of Frumkin was fundamentally interrelated with
the Nazi war effort"); Iwanowa, 67 E Supp. 2d at 445-46 (concluding that the complaint pled facts to
support the conclusion that private corporate defendants were de facto state actors).
220. There is significant disagreement about the relationship between slave/forced labor and the war
effort, as well as disagreement as to the relationship between the private companies and the Reich. Forced
labor programs were not simply a by-product of the war effort; instead, they were thoroughly structured
by racial hierarchy, including the goal of "annihilation by labor" for Jews. Adler and Zumbansen, supra
note 39, at 47 (quoting BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE
QUEST FOR COMPENSATION 17-18 (1979)). Although private companies argue that they were "agencies
of the Reich" and were forced to use slave labor, this is disputed, id. at 43-44, 52, as is the extent to
which such companies actually initiated the use of slave and forced labor. Id. at 44 n.280.
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for conduct unrelated to slave or forced labor. The French Agreement, for
example, covers "any and all claims that have been or may be asserted
against the Banks ...arising from World War II. ' 221 The definition of "the
Banks" refers explicitly to defendants in three U.S. lawsuits. 222 These lawsuits include a number of factual allegations that relate not to reparations,
but to post-war conduct, including the claim that "failing to return plaintiffs' funds and repeated denials of information to plaintiffs constitute a deliberate, continuous, and ongoing violation of international law for the past
fifty years, ' 22 3 and the claim that the "defendants unjustly refused to return
the looted assets, enriched themselves with the derivative profits, and concealed information, value, and derivative profits of the looted assets from the
plaintiffs. "224 The German Agreement is even broader; it purports to resolve
all claims against all German companies arising out of or relating to World
War 11.225
The limited post-war reparations agreements provide little support for
unilateral nullification of such claims by the executive branch. Whatever
authority the Commander-in-Chief power may give the President over reparations issues is substantially diminished by the passage of fifty years since
the war's conclusion. Moreover, none of the earlier agreements, including the
reparations agreements with, potential implications for private claims, explicitly contemplates extinguishing claims cognizable in U.S. courts. Thus
these recent agreements squarely present Supremacy Clause issues not raised
by the earlier agreements. Finally, unlike the claims against foreign sovereigns that the Court considered in Dames & Moore, there is no long-standing
history of sole executive control over these claims against private parties,
even in the reparations context, and no statutory stamp of approval for such
control (as with the Foreign Claims Settlement Act).
5. ExpropriationClaims Settlements
Expropriation provides another key category of executive claims settlement agreements. Historically, these agreements, too, have settled claims
against foreign governments. Before the end of World War II, diplomatic
pressure from the State Department resolved expropriation claims against
Nicaragua (1909 and 1911), Cuba (1925), Guatemala (1930), the Soviet
Union (1933), Bolivia (1942), and several with Mexico. 226 Most were resolved through the exchange of diplomatic notes providing for arbitration of

221. FRENCH AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 1(1).

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. annex A.
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 122.
GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, art. 1(1).

226. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter EXPROPRIATION REPORT].
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individual claims. 227 After World War II, most expropriation claims were
resolved through lump sum agreements pursuant to which the foreign government made a lump sum payment to the United States and the United
States divided it among claimants.2 2 8 The first post-war agreement of this
type was reached with Yugoslavia in 1948.229 Under the agreement, the
United States released blocked Yugoslav assets, the Yugoslavian government
paid $17 million to settle all U.S. claims against it, and the U.S. govern230
ment paid individual claimants.
Although the State Department concluded the agreement with Yugoslavia as a sole executive agreement, Congress enacted the International Claim
Settlement Act in the following year, creating the International Claim Settlement Commission as the domestic mechanism for making payments to
individual claimants pursuant to this, and future, claims settlement agreements. 231 The act provides congressional approval for executive branch settlement of international claims related to the taking of property, but limits
its authorization to claims against foreign governments.232 The Dames & Moore
opinion relied on this act to show congressional acquiescence in the practice
of claims settlements by sole executive agreement 2 33 but neither the act, nor
the conclusion of acquiescence, apply to claims against private parties. 234
The executive branch has negotiated at least twelve lump sum claims settlement agreements related to nationalization 235 that have been administered
by the International Claims Commission 236 (now the Foreign Claims Set-

227. The 1911 agreement with Nicaragua and a 1941 agreement with Mexico established a mixed
claims commission; the Cuban and Guatemalan claims were resolved by one-time arbitration. Id. at
1074-76, 1079-81.
228. See generally 1 LILLICH & WESTON, supra note 142, at 30-31 (discussing the history of lump sum
agreements and the increase in their use after World War II).
229. EXPROPRIATION REPORT, supra note 226, at 1082.

230. Id.
231. Pub. L. No. 81-455, 64 Star. 12 (1950) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2002)).
232. The International Claims Settlement Act provides: "The Commission shall have jurisdiction to
receive, examine, adjudicate, and render final decisions with respect to claims of the Government of the
United States and of nationals of the United States included within the terms of the Yugoslav Claims
Agreement of 1948, or included within the terms of any claims agreement hereafter concluded between
the Government of the United States and a foreign government (exclusive of governments against which
the United States declared the existence of a state of war during World War 11) similarly providing for
the settlement and discharge of claims of the Government of the United States and the nationals of the
United States against aforeign government, arising out of the nationalization or other taking of property, by
the agreement of the Government of the United States to accept from that government a sum in en bloc
settlement thereof." Id. § 4(A), 64 Stat. at 13-14.
233. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-82 (1981).
234. Id.
235. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) has administered some claims programs not
related to nationalization, including (after the merger with the War Claims Commission) some related to
war claims. See 1973 FCSC ANN. REP. 30-31 (administering claims by prisoners of war in Vietnam); id.
at 14-15, 17-18 (administering war claims against Italy).
236. AGREEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN OUTSTANDING CLAIMS, U.S.-AIb., Mar. 10,
1995, TI.A.S. No. 12,611; AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY CLAIMS,
U.S.-Vietnam, Jan. 28, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 12,602; AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF
CERTAIN PROPERTY CLAIMS, U.S.-F.R.G., May 13, 1992, T.I.A.S No. 11,959; COMPENSATION AGREE-
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tlement Commission). 237 With the exception of the agreement with Hungary, none of the nationalization agreements explicitly resolve claims between U.S. and foreign nationals. The Hungarian agreement provides that
[tihe Government of the Hungarian People's Republic agrees to pay,
and the Government of the United States agrees to accept, the lump
sum of $18,900,000 (eighteen million nine hundred thousand dollars)
in United States currency in full and final settlement and in discharge
of all claims of the Government and nationals of the United States
of8 the Hungarian People's Repubagainst the Government and nationals23
lic which are described in this Agreement.
Although this language appears to contemplate the settlement of nationalto-national claims, none of the categories of claims covered by the agreement
explicitly includes such claims. 239 Moreover, legislation passed by Congress

MENT, U.S.-Eth., Dec. 19, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,193; AGREEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN
OUTSTANDING CLAIMS AND FINANCIAL ISSUES, U.S.-Czech. Soc. Rep., Jan. 29, 1982, T.I.A.S. No.
11,264; AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-PR.C., May 11, 1979, 30

U.S.T. 1957; AGREEMENT CONCERNING CLAIMS OF NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S.-Egypt,
May 1, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 4214; AGREEMENT REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Hung.,
Mar. 6, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 522 [hereinafter SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Hung.]; AGREEMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS, U.S.-Yugo., Nov. 5, 1964, 16 U.S.T. 1; AGREEMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS AND RELATED FINANCIAL MATTERS, U.S.-Bulg., July
2, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 969; AGREEMENT RELATING TO FINANCIAL QUESTIONS, U.S.-Rom., Mar. 30, 1960,

11 U.S.T. 317; AGREEMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S.-Pol.,
July 16, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1953.
237. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 3985 (July 1, 1954), reprintedas a note to 5 U.S.C.
§ 1622 (2002), and in 68 Stat. 1279 (1954). A handful of other sole executive agreements resolved nationalization issues apparently without the involvement of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY CLAIMS, U.S.-Cambodia, Oct. 6,
1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12,193; CLAIMS: MARCONA MINING COMPANY, U.S.-Peru, Sept. 22, 1976, T.I.A.S.

No. 8,417; SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN CLAIMS, U.S.-Peru, Feb. 19, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 227. Other sole
executive agreements with Egypt and Vietnam resolved claims related to the property of the U.S. government, with no mention of claims by U.S. nationals. AGREEMENT CONCERNING OFFICIAL CLAIMS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S.-Egypt, May 19, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 7303; MUTUAL WAIVER

OF CERTAIN CLAIMS, U.S.-Vietnam, Feb. 9, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 140.
238. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Hung., supra note 236, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
239. The agreement resolved four types of claims: (1) those concerning property rights affected by

Hungarian nationalization measures; (2) certain obligations expressed in U.S. currency; (3) obligations of
the Hungarian government under the Treaty of Peace between Hungary and the United States; and
(4) losses referred to in a diplomatic note from the United States to the Government of Hungary on
December 10, 1952, which is not duplicated in the agreement. Id. art. 2. Public Law Number 93-460,
which amended the International Claims Settlement Act, gave the FCSC the power to make awards
against the Hungarian government for claims in the first category. 88 Stat. 1386 (1974). The third category
also applied to government obligations. The second category speaks in terms of obligations expressed in
the currency of the United States "arising out of contractual or other rights acquired by nationals of the
United States prior to September 1, 1939," which could include obligations of Hungarian nationals.
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS, U.S.-Hung., supra note 236, art. 2(2). The implementing legislation did not,
however, authorize the FCSC to make payments based on this provision, id., and the FCSC reasoned that
this language referred to claims based on bonds issued by the government of Hungary, expressed in U.S.
currency, based in part on Annex E of the 1973 agreement, which refers to the "settlement of outstanding
dollar bonds issued by predecessor Hungarian governments." In the Matter of the Claim of Nita Mea
Aubel, Claim No. Hung-2-021, Decision No. HUNG-2-014, 1975 FCSC ANN. REP. 43. Elsewhere, the
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implementing the agreement refers only to claims against the Hungarian
Government;2 40 no courts have used this agreement to deny or dismiss claims
against Hungarian nationals, and the Commission appears to have required
state responsibility by the Hungarian government before granting claims.2 4'
6. Executive Settlement of Holocaust-RelatedClaims of U.S. Nationals
The executive branch also has negotiated Holocaust-related claims settlement agreements outside of the reparations and expropriation contexts,
including some in the past twenty years; but none of these agreements settled claims against private parties.2 42 Most significantly, a recent agreement
FCSC reasoned that the terms 'obligations ... arising out of contractual or other rights,' as used in
Section 303(3) of the Act, was not limited to bonds ... but also included other types of government obligations." FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, DECISIONS AND ANNOTATIONS 245-46 (1968) (emphasis added).
240. 22 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2002). Seealso 1975 FCSC ANN. REP. 30-32 (describing the work of the
FCSC with respect to claims against the Government of Hungary).
241. SeeClaim of European Mortgage Series B. Corp., Claim No. Hung-22,020, Decision No. 1,605,
reprinted in FCSC SEMI-ANN. REP., Jan.-June 1959, at 72, 76-77.
242. Three agreements with China from 1999 resolved claims related to the bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in May 1999. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DELEGATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, U.S.-P.R.C., Jul. 30, 1999, Temp. State Dep't No. 99-116, 1999 WL
798688; AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE

GOVERNMENT OP THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, U.S.-P.R.C., Dec. 16, 1999, Temp. State Dep't
No. 00-15, 1999 WL 1565467; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,

U.S.-P.R.C., Dec. 16, 1999, Temp. State Dep't No. 00-16, 1999 WL 1565468. An agreement with
Japan concerned the rights of Japanese and Micronesian nationals against Japan and the United States.
AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, U.S.-Japan, Apr. 18, 1969,
20 U.S.T. 2654. Even if the agreement can be read to cover claims between private parties, it does not
undermine the argument advanced in this Article, because the agreement was implemented domestically
through an act of Congress. SeeAntolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cit. 1988). Four agreements with Russia renegotiated the payment by Russia of debts to or guaranteed by the United States.
AGREEMENT REGARDING THE RESCHEDULING OF CERTAIN DEBTS OWED TO OR GUARANTEED BY THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, U.S.-Russ., Feb. 6, 1997, Hein's No. KAV 4885, Temp. State Dep't No.

97-75. Similar agreements were negotiated with Russia in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Seeid. art. IL.l(b)-(d).
An agreement with Canada resolved environmental claims against the U.S. military. AGREEMENT ON A
FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS FOR COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP AT FORMER

U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CANADA, U.S.-Can., Oct. 7-9, 1996, Hein's No KAV 4776, Temp.
State Dep't No. 96-191. An agreement with the United Kingdom resolved claims by the U.S. government relating to user charges by the U.K. government imposed at Heathrow Airport. AGREEMENT
CONCERNING AIR SERVICES, U.S.-U.K., July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, amended by AGREEMENT
AMENDING THE AGREEMENT OFJULY 23, 1977, As AMENDED, U.S.-U.K., Dec. 4, 1980, 33 U.S.T.655.
Agreements with Iran resolved claims pending before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT REGARDING CERTAIN CLAIMS BEFORE THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, U.S.-Iran, Feb.
9, 1996, Hein's No. KAV 4609, Temp. State Dep't No. 96-82. Seealso Bederman & Botcher, supra note
139 (discussing a 1990 executive agreement settling small claims by U.S. nationals against Iran). Other
agreements with Iran settled Iranian claims against the U.S. government related to the "aerial incident of
3 July 1998," which was the subject of a suit at the International Court of Justice. SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ON THE CASE CONCERNING THE AERIAL INCIDENT OF JULY 3, 1988 BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, U.S.-Iran, Feb. 9, 1996, Hein's No. KAV 4610, Temp. State Dep't No.

96-83; GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN I.C.J.
AND TRIBUNAL CASES, U.S.Iran, Feb. 9, 1996, Hein's No. KAV 4611, Temp. State Dep't No. 96-84. A 1989 agreement with Iraq
provided for compensation to the families of those who were killed when the U.S.S. Stark sank. AGREE-
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with Germany settled certain claims against the German government on
behalf of victims of National Socialist persecution who were U.S. nationals
at the time of their persecution. 243 The agreement does not purport to resolve U.S. claims against German nationals, even though achieving this result was one of the purposes of the agreement.
The agreement was prompted by the case of Hugo Princz, a U.S. citizen
who lived in what is now Slovakia when he was arrested in 1942 and sent to
a concentration camp, where his entire family died. 244 Princz did not receive
compensation from Germany because he was a U.S. citizen, and the D.C.
Circuit dismissed his case against Germany under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. 245 In response, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a
246
bill that would have stripped Germany of immunity.
The pending legislation prompted Germany to agree to a resolution of the
issue through diplomatic channels. 247 Pursuant to the executive agreement
negotiated in response, Germany paid three million German marks to settle
all known claims within the scope of the agreement, and agreed to make
comparable payment to other victims identified by the United States. 248 The
agreement permitted payment only if the "national executes a waiver of all
compensation claims within the meaning of article 1 against the Federal
Republic of Germany and against its nationals (including natural and juridical persons). '249 In other words, in order to benefit from the settlement,
claimants had to waive their rights to bring suit against German nationals.

MENT CONCERNING CLAIMS RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. STARK, U.S.-Iraq, Mar. 27-

28, 1989, Hein's No. KAV 934, Temp. State Dep't No. 89-106. Finally, an agreement between the
United States and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), settled (for over $19 million) all claims
of the U.S. government related to injuries to U.S. military personnel participating in the MFO. The
United States agreed that none of its agencies or instrumentalities would bring any legal action against
the MFO and other parties. The United States also agreed, in the event of third party litigation against
the MFO (or against Egypt or the State of Israel), to consult with them regarding immunities and, "as
appropriate," offer "support and cooperation, including participation in legal proceedings, in securing
proper recognition and enforcement of such immunities." AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT
OF CLAIMS, C, U.S.-MFO, May 3, 1990, Hein's No. KAV 2644, Temp. State Dep't No. 90-216, art. C.
The agreement thus formally settles all claims of the U.S. government. As to claims by other parties that
might arise in U.S. courts, the United States pledged its assistance but did not purport to resolve them.
243. AGREEMENT CONCERNING FINAL BENEFITS TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES NATIONALS WHO
WERE VICTIMS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST MEASURES OF PERSECUTION, U.S.-F.R.G., Sept. 19, 1995,
Hein's No. KAV 4453, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-226 [hereinafter AGREEMENT CONCERNING FINAL
BENEFITS].
244. Delissa A. RidgwayJusticefor the "ForgottenVictims": U.S. Survivors of the Holocaust, 9 J.L. & POL'Y
767, 769 (2001).
245. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
246. Ridgway, supra note 244, at 772.
247. Id. at 771-72.
248. AGREEMENT CONCERNING FINAL BENEFITS, supra note 243. Congress then passed legislation
permitting the Federal Claims Settlement Commission to identify and adjudicate the claims not yet
known. Holocaust Survivors Claims Act, § 119 (incorporated by reference in Pub. L. No. 104- 99, § 211,
110 Star. 37-38 (1996)).
249. AGREEMENT CONCERNING FINAL BENEFITS, supra note 243, arts. 1-3, 4(3) (emphasis added).
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The agreement did not, however, purport to resolve such claims of its own
250
force.
7. Other Indicia of CongressionalIntent
Congress has in a number of ways encouraged private litigation in the
United States against foreign parties for violations of human rights. The
dramatic rise of Alien Tort Statute cases during the last two decades might
have led Congress to limit its scope. However, Congress instead enhanced
the scope of the act, by adding U.S. nationals (rather than just "aliens") to
those who may bring claims against foreign sovereigns for torture. 251 Since
September 11, the State Department has sought to prevent former hostages
from recovering against the government of Iran, while Congress has voted to
permit the hostages to collect.2 52 The passage of a House Bill stripping
Germany of immunity in certain Holocaust-related cases prompted, as described above, an executive agreement in which Germany paid millions of
dollars to compensate U.S. victims of the Holocaust.
In 1998, Congress passed the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of
1998,253 which created a commission to investigate potential possession by
the federal government of assets obtained from victims of the Holocaust and
to encourage the investigation of Holocaust-era practices of insurance companies. 254 This legislation, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "at least implicitly"
encouraged states to conduct their own investigations into insurance companies doing business in Europe between 1920 and 1945, which is what
some states have done. 255 California has passed legislation requiring disclosures by insurance companies and lifting statutes of limitations for claims
based on Holocaust-era insurance policies. 256 California legislation also created a right of action for forced and slave labor cases based on World War IIera conduct, 257 although a federal district court in California struck down
the California slave-labor statute as an unconstitutional infringement upon

250. A second agreement provided an additional 34.5 million German marks to resolve claims that
were unknown at the time of the first agreement. SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO THE AGREEMENT
OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 CONCERNING FINAL BENEFITS TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES NATIONALS WHO
WERE VICTIMS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST MEASURES OF PERSECUTION, U.S.-F.R.G., Jan. 25, 1999,
Temp. State Dep't No. 99-37, 1999 WI. 212166.
251. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 23, at 112 (describing this and other ways that Congress has
supported private causes of action for wrongs inflicted by foreign sovereigns, often over the objection of
the administration).
252. Matthew L. Wald, Seeking Damages from Iran, Ex-Marine Must Battle Bush Administration, Too,
NY TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 15.
253. Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 611 (1998).
254. Id.
255. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cit. 2001).
256. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-13807 (1999). The statute has been challenged by insurance-industry
plaintiffs. Gerling, 240 F.3d at 754 (holding that the statute did not violate the dormant commerce clause
but remanding for consideration of plaintiffs' due process argument).
257. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999).
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the federal government's foreign affairs power.2 58 Both state and federal legislatures have thus shown significant support for providing relief to Holocaust victims through state and federal courts.2 59 This fact puts these cases
260
on significantly different footing than those at issue in Dames & Moore.
C. Conclusion
As discussed in Part II, there is support in the text of the Constitution for
the presidential power to conclude sole executive agreements, but both the
Treaty Clause and the Supremacy Clause appear, as a textual matter, to impose some limits on this authority. Historical practice provides one way of
258. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (N.D. Cal.
2001). Seegenerally Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 290-92 (describing California legislation and cases).
259. See generally Murphy, supra note 48.
260. The importance of Dames & Moore for claims against private parties is also limited for another
reason: in the context of foreign sovereign immunity, both the President and Congress had successfully
exerted sweeping authority over claims against foreign sovereigns. In other words, the determination of
whether such cases would go forward was already entirely within the control of the federal government
either through the FSIA, or through deference to executive branch statements of immunity. In Ex Parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), the Supreme Court held that the courts must accept suggestions of
immunity for foreign sovereigns by the executive branch as a "conclusive determination by the political
arm of the Government" that the suit in question would interfere "with the proper conduct of our foreign
relations." Id. at 589. See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.").
After 1945, suggestions of immunity by the Department of State have been treated as conclusive by
both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, 660 E2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1981)
(listing cases); Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1988). This represented a limitation on the power of state courts, which had, until 1943, decided issues of foreign sovereign immunity
not only on the basis of international law but also on their own determinations as to whether application
of the doctrine would promote justice. See, e.g., Pilger v. U.S. Steel Corp., 127 A. 103, 108 (N.J. Ch.
1925). In 1976 Congress passed the FSIA, which comprehensively addressed the amenability of foreign
sovereigns to suit in the United States. The executive branch supported the FSIA in part because it did
not like the pressure that foreign countries applied to the State Department to secure suggestions of
immunity, and in part because it recognized that such suggestions were not entirely consistent from case
to case. See Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations ofthe House Comm. on theJudiciary,94th Cong. 24, 26-27
(1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State) [hereinafter Jurisdiction
Hearings].
Thus when Dames & Moore upheld the claims settlement agreement in part because of congressional
acquiescence in executive branch practice, it did so where both the executive branch and Congress had
exercised wide-ranging authority over such claims. There is no similar context for the resolution of claims
against private parties; upholding such agreements means that sole executive branch action makes
significant inroads into state legislative authority in a way that Dames & Moore did not. The point is not
that Dames & Moore had no impact on state law claims: some claims nullified by the executive order at
issue in that case were brought under state law. The point is instead that when it enacted the FSIA, the
federal government exercised its "undisputed power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and
under what circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States." Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983). One of the key questions for the Dames & Moore
court was whether the President had the authority to nullify claims in U.S. courts that were explicitly
permitted by the FSIA. Outside the operation of the FSIA, the executive branch continues to have complete control over the immunity of foreign heads of state. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d
259, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y 2000). But in the context of private defendants, there is no sweeping federal
statute, and the search for congressional acquiescence therefore makes far less sense.
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delimiting the President's power. By this measure, there is no long-standing
history of executive settlement of claims against private parties. Moreover,
such settlements raise particularly acute Supremacy Clause concerns, since
they potentially nullify both federal and state law claims in an area of uncertain executive authority. For these reasons, the executive branch does not
have the authority to nullify outright the claims resolved by the recent executive agreements with France, Germany, and Austria. The bids for deference pursuant to the recent executive agreements should be viewed in this
context.
IV. SCHOLARSHIP

As set forth above, deference to sole executive agreements that seek to
terminate domestic litigation against private parties threatens to undermine
the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution. Especially where
there is no long-standing history of such agreements from which this authority might be inferred, convincing arguments by scholars that executive
agreements terminating private litigation need not be concluded as treaties
would resolve much of the constitutional tension inherent in deference to
these sole executive agreements. However, as the following discussion explains, scholars have not focused on the claims settlement power, nor have
they focused on how deference can undermine the distinctions between ex261
ecutive agreements and treaties.
Professor Ramsey argues, based on constitutional text and original intent,
that the President has the power to enter into minor and temporary short262
term sole executive agreements that lack any domestic legislative effect,
but does not have the power to resolve by sole executive agreement litigation pending in the U.S. courts, whether against foreign sovereigns or individuals. 263 Thus, the Supreme Court was wrong to give domestic legal effect
264
to the executive agreements at issue in Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore.
The textual argument is based in part on the Supremacy Clause and its
use of the term "Treaties," rather than broader language such as "compact,"
or "agreement," discussed in Part II above. From this text, and evidence of
original intent, Ramsey concludes, executive agreements should not be
'
given "domestic" or "legislative effect. "265

261. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 14; David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439 (1999) [hereinafter Bederman, Deference or Deception]; David Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994) [hereinafter Bederman,
Revivalist Canons]. Professor Bradley examines the. role of Chevron-style deference in the foreign affairs
context but does not discuss how deference helps define the independent law-making power of the executive branch in foreign affairs. See Bradley, supra note 14, at 678-79, 709. Professor Bederman considers
the role of deference in the interpretation of treaties. See Bederman, Deference or Deception, supra, at 1440.
262. Ramsey, supra note 35, at 136-37.
263. Id.at 137 n. 19 (providing author's definition of "domestic legal effect").
264. Id. at 218-35, 237-40, 238 n.410.
265. Id. at 225-31, 238-40.
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What, however, constitutes "domestic" and "legislative effect?" 266 This
question is both important and difficult, as consideration of the claims settlement power illustrates. Ramsey argues that executive settlement of cases
against foreign sovereigns during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries had no "domestic effect" because foreign sovereigns were, under
international law, immune from suit in U.S. courts. 267 By the middle of the
twentieth century, questions of foreign sovereign immunity had become the
prerogative of the executive branch. 268 Because the executive branch made
the final decision as to whether a foreign government could be sued in U.S.
courts, would not the decision to settle a case with a foreign sovereign
through a sole executive agreement have a "domestic effect?" On the other
hand, if the Constitution gives the President sole power to determine the
amenability of foreign sovereigns to suit, and if the President has enjoyed
such power since 1799, would the President not have the power to settle
269
such suits as well?
After Congress (at the suggestion of the President) passed the FSIA, executive settlement of claims arising under the act clearly had "domestic effect." Thus, under Ramsey's analysis, the President lacks the power to settle
such claims pursuant to a sole executive agreement. 270 But to conclude that
the executive branch also lacked the power to settle claims before the enactment of FSIA creates the anomaly that it had control over such claims, except to settle them (and that it historically had, but lost, this power to settle
such claims). To conclude that the executive branch did have the power to
settle claims before the FSIA would mean that somehow the FSIA nullified
that power, although neither Congress nor the President appears to have so
27 1
intended.
The first general point here is that the line demarcating "domestic effect"
is blurred. As soon as sovereign immunity ceased to be an absolute doctrine
(assuming that, as Ramsey suggests, it was absolute at one time) and the
courts began to consider the view of the executive branch on the question of
266. Ramsey defines an international agreement as having "domestic legal effect" if it "alters rights
and obligations as a matter of U.S. law." Id. at 137 n.19.
267. id. at 230 n.380.
268. See discussion sapranote 260.
269. Professor Ramsey has suggested elsewhere that he does not agree with the deference that the
courts gave to executive branch suggestions of immunity, drawing a distinction between presidential
determinations of status (i.e., recognition) from which legal consequences might follow, and an immunity decision made by the President on a case by case basis in the context of particular litigation. See
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 79, at 263 n.125. That does not solve the problem, however, for Prakash
and Ramsey still leave us with the issue of distinguishing between treaties and executive agreements
based on "legislative effect." Without a systematic treatment of deference doctrines and their relationship
to "legislative effect," the exception threatens to swallow the rule.
270. Ramsey, supra note 35, at 238. Professor Ramsey, although largely limiting his analysis to
"original design," nonetheless suggests that executive agreements with domestic effect might be justified
if the Senate does not have the time to consider the agreements. Id. at 238 n.410, 239.
271. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 685-86 (1981) (explicitly rejecting the argument
that FSIA limited the President's power to enter into claims settlement agreements, based in part on the
drafting history of the FSIA).
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immunity, foreign claims settlements began having some "domestic effect,"
even outside the operation of the formal application of Article VI. The problem is not resolved by lodging the authority to make sole executive agreements in Article II's vesting of executive power with the President; the
treaty power, shared with the Senate, is a limitation on the President's general executive power (as Ramsey and Prakash argue). 272 Hence a line must
27 3
still be drawn. between treaties and executive agreements.
The second general point is that although demarcating the bounds of the
Supremacy Clause helps to map the constitutional limits on executive authority to enter into sole executive agreements that are enforced in U.S.
courts, no matter where these lines are drawn the real action is sometimes on
another stage-the one on which deference is playing. This point is forcefully illustrated by the development of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, and by the differing positions of Professors Clark and Ramsey on the
outcome of the Supreme Court cases enforcing sole executive agreements.4
27
Ramsey suggests that Belmont and Dames & Moore were incorrectly decided.
By contrast, Clark, who agrees with Ramsey that non-treaty agreements
raise important Supremacy Clause issues, 275 defends Belmont as judicial deference to the executive branch under the act of state doctrine, 276 and Dames
& Moore as the executive branch response to an "important foreign policy
crisis" 277 that "recalls" the political question doctrine. 278 Judicial deference
272. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 79, at 253-54.
273. Professor Tribe has offered a text-based argument against the interchangeability of congressionalexecutive agreements but concedes that some types of international agreements do not rise to the level of
treaties under Article II of the Constitution and may be concluded by the President alone. Tribe, supra
note 34, at 1266-67. Tribe distinguishes the two based on the degree to which an agreement "constrains
federal or state sovereignty and submits United States citizens or political entities to the authority of
bodies wholly or partially separate from the ordinary arms of federal or state government." Id. at 1268.
There are problems with Tribe's formulation, as other scholars have noted. See Spiro, supra note 34, at
973-81; Yoo, supra note 21, at 788-98. Applying his formulation here implies that any executive agreement referring claims to another arbitral body for resolution (including the Dames & Moore agreement
and all of the nineteenth-century sole executive agreements referring claims against foreign sovereigns to
arbitration commissions) would be unconstitutional, but a claims settlement agreement that outright
nullified existing claims (against foreign sovereigns or individuals) would be constitutional, at least from
a separation of powers perspective. Focusing on the extent to which an agreement constrains federal or
state sovereignty by looking at the extent to which it conflicts with "ordinary state and federal lawmaking authority," Tribe, supra note 34, at 1268 (quoting a letter from Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter
to Sen. Hollings of October 18, 1994), may suggest an approach consistent with the Supremacy Clause as
well as state interests. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L.
REv. 1321, 1345 (2001) (arguing that the "procedures governing the adopting of treaties were also designed to facilitate state influence"). This part of Tribe's inquiry asks, at least in part, how consistent the
operation of the sole executive agreement is with the Supremacy Clause-whether something other than a
treaty or law of the United States can act as the "Supreme Law of the Land" and thereby bind judges in
every state.
274. Ramsey, supra note 35, at 234-40. With respect to Dames & Moore, Ramsey argues that because
the case involved "material nonexecutoty agreements," it would "likely" not come within the President's
power to conclude non-treaty agreements. Id at 238.
275. Clark, supra note 273, at 1438-52.
276. Id. at 1448-49.
277. Id. at 1452.
278. Id. at 1452 n.830. See also CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
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thus threatens to swallow textual commitments of authority in difficult
cases. A complete picture of the President's power to conclude executive
agreements that diminish the rights of private parties in U.S. courts must
include an analysis of the political question and other deference-based doc27 9
trines.
Another loosely grouped set of scholars has focused upon the practice of
the executive branch and Congress as a-significant guide to demarcating the
boundaries between treaties and other constitutionally permissible forms of
international agreements-particularly congressional-executive agreementsbut without significant attention to the courts' role in mediating such practice. Professors Ackerman and Golove argue that a "constitutional moment"
in the 194 0s legitimated the full interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements. 280 Professor Spiro argues that practice provides
28 1
the basis for incremental changes in the Constitution's allocation of power,
and Professor Yoo argues that contemporary practice confirms the textual
allocation of authority. 282 However, with the exception of Professor Spiro,
these scholars do not offer guidance to the courts as to when they must consider executive branch and Congressional practice in resolving textual interstices. 28 3 Professor Spiro provides such guidance through a powerful theory
of constitutional "increments," where the importance of practice is evaluated
based on acceptance, contestedness, age, and pedigree, 284 but he does not
(fully) develop how courts would apply this methodology, nor does he em-

JURISDICTION 2D § 3534.2 (2d ed. 1987) (speculating that Dames & Moore did not mention the political
question doctrine because the case involved private property rights).
279. Other distinctions between constitutional and unconstitutional executive agreements are also
undermined by the claims settlement history. Professor Paul, for example, posits that sole executive
agreements were originally used only for "contemporaneous exchanges which imposed no future obligations on any party." Paul, supra note 34, at 737. Because of this "temporal limitation," such agreements
had "no effect on U.S. domestic law." Id. at 742. This logic is difficult to follow: a one-time, contemporaneous agreement to nullify claims pending in U.S. courts in return for a lump-sum payment by a
foreign government to the United States seems to qualify as "contemporaneous," yet has significant
domestic effect. Professor Paul argues that before the Roosevelt administration, executive agreements
were used "in a few limited circumstances," in accordance with (what he terms) the traditional view that
they should only be used for contemporaneous exchanges. Id. Yet in the late nineteenth century, executive
agreements established a number of arbitration commissions to resolve claims. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text. If these claims commissions fall within the definition of "contemporaneous
exchanges," then why does Dames & Moore not fitwithin that definition? See id. at 761-66 (criticizing
Dames & Moore). A major difference, of course, is that in Dames & Moore the President nullified claims in
U.S. courts, but this is not the difference upon which Professor Paul relies.
280. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34.
281. Spiro, supra note 34, at 1009-35.
282. Yoo, supra note 21. Professor Yoo relies on current practice and text but, as Professor Spiro notes,
does not provide for changes in practice. Spiro, supra note 34, at 1007-09.
283. This is because their theories are not directed at the courts. Ackerman's theory permits constitutional change only at watershed moments, involving participation of the people, not intended to describe
a theory of deference for the courts. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 873-75. Yoo describes current
practice as reflecting allocation of constitutional powers, without considering whether and how changes
in practice are legitimate or inform our reading of the constitutional allocation of authority. Yoo, supra
note 21.
284. Spiro, supra note 34, at 1026-27.
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phasize a strong separation of powers framework for this analysis. As a result, when courts actually consider challenges to congressional-executive
agreements (i.e., when the "rubber meets the road"),28 5 they begin (and often
end) with the political question doctrine, which provides a substantially
different analysis than that of scholars who write about the constitutionality
of congressional-executive agreements.2 86 Thus, for example, when courts
actually considered challenges to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)--an issue much debated in the scholarship discussed above-their
analysis was framed almost entirely by the political question doctrine. The
argument that "major and significant" agreements require Senate ratification
as treaties-an argument that scholars have defended 287-was rejected by
the Eleventh Circuit under the political question doctrine as beyond judicial
288
expertise.
In short, deference scholarship has not squarely confronted separation of
powers issues; the work on the textual commitments of foreign affairs authority has skirted important deference questions; and scholars that have
focused on constitutional change based on practice have not fully considered
the role of courts. For the most part, these issues were simply outside the
scope of each author's respective thesis. However, as the recent Statements of
Interest illustrate, textual commitments of authority and deference-based
doctrines need better integration.
V.

DOCTRINAL APPROACHES

The first four Parts of this Article have considered the constitutional tension created by judicial deference to sole executive agreements to terminate
domestic litigation, as well as several potential ways of resolving the tension.
However, historical practice by the executive branch, other indicia of congressional intent, and academic scholarship on the issue have not provided a
basis for executive lawmaking that would answer the Treaty and Supremacy
Clause problems. This Part considers other arguments in favor of deference.
28 9
Courts considering the issue have applied the political question doctrine

285. 1 am indebted to Professor Jack Chin for calling my attention to this phrase, albeit in a somewhat different context (my reappointment vote).
286. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 1999),
vacatedby 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cit. 2001).
287. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 183 (1990).
288. Made in the USA Found., 242 F3d at 1315-16. The court also rejected Tribe's approach for similar reasons. Id. at 1315 n.33. One could argue, perhaps, that the Eleventh Circuit was simply referring to
the appellant's briefing of this issue, and that had the briefing provided better standards applying this
line, the court might have reasoned differently. See id. at 1315. The point here, however, is that courts
approach this question by looking first at issues like "judicial expertise," which is not how scholars have
addressed it.
289. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D.N.J. 2001). Cf In re Austrian and German Holocaust Litig., 250 F 3d 156, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2001) (granting mandamus relief in cases where plaintiffs
sought voluntary dismissal and referring to the political question doctrine when ordering the district
court to strike parts of its order).
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and international comity 29 0-- the same doctrinal approaches were used by
courts to dismiss Holocaust-era cases even before the agreements were concluded. 291 The doctrines also fail to provide a convincing rationale for deference. Although rooted in separation of powers concerns, they fail to alert
courts to the separation of powers problems raised by deference to these sole
executive agreements. The final Part considers an alternative approach that
stays far closer to the text and balance of power of the Constitution.
A. PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
The political question doctrine provides that certain matters are not
suited for determination by the federal judiciary. The leading case on the
doctrine, Baker v. Carr, noted that the doctrine may have particular force in
the context of foreign affairs because the issues raised by such cases frequently "defy judicial application," or are committed to the discretion of the
executive branch or Congress. 292 Furthermore, such issues frequently require
the nation to speak with a single voice. 293 The Baker court also commented,
however, that not all such cases lie "beyond judicial cognizance."' 294 The
Court listed six factors that help to determine whether to apply the doctrine:
(1) textual commitment of the issue to a "coordinate political department";
(2) lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards to resolve the
issue; (3) the impossibility of deciding the issue without making a nonjudicial policy determination; (4) the potential for showing a lack of respect that
is otherwise due other branches of government; (5) an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made," or (6) the potential for embarrassment from "multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. ''295 Scholars have debated at length the extent
to which the political question doctrine undermines the "rule of law" and
any duty of courts to decide cases. 296 Other commentators have characterized
the doctrine as one form of deference among many others afforded by the
courts to the executive branch and Congress. 297 Application of the political
290. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 386-88.
291. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,483-91 (D.NJ. 1999).
292. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
293. Id.
294. id.
295. Id. at 217.
296. See generally J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
108-118 (1988) (describing the debate over the doctrine among Judge Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler,
Alexander Bickel, Louis Henkin, and others). There is no shortage of scholarship criticizing the doctrine.
See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW

APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); Martin Redish,JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1031 (1984).
297. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE .J. 597, 599 (1976);
Bradley, supra note 14, at 659-61 (describing the political question doctrine as a form of deference);
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fallof the Political Question Doctrineand the Rise ofJudicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 242 (2002) (arguing that the political question doctrine is part of a
"spectrum of deference that is inferred from the Constitution's text, structure, and history").
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question doctrine in response to recent executive agreements and to foreign
foundations designed to compensate plaintiffs in World War II-related litigation in U.S. courts highlights both the use of the doctrine as a form of
judicial deference and the conflicts that often arise between Congress and the
2 98
executive branch when the doctrine is invoked.
Applying the political question doctrine, the Nazi Era Cases court dismissed a forced labor case against corporations despite the plaintiff's objections,2 99 pursuant to the recently concluded German Agreement. 300 Although the agreement in question did not actually resolve or settle the
claims, the district court reasoned that the Statement of Interest submitted
by the U.S. government pursuant to the agreement, coupled with the history of attempts to resolve post-World War II reparations issues through
government negotiation, warranted dismissal. 30 1 Judicial resolution of the
claims, the court concluded, would constitute "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government" (the fourth Baker factor) and would poten30 2
tially embarrass the United States (the sixth Baker factor).
Unfortunately, the factors articulated in Baker invite courts to engage in a
superficial and potentially meaningless separation of powers analysis. Here,
the court consistently referred to World War II reparations as an issue for
the "political branches," conflating the executive branch with "the governmental level," the "government," and the "political branches." 30 3 What the
court neglected in this analysis are two key separation of powers points:
(1) that treaties and executive agreements are constitutionally distinct, and
that the resolution of an issue by the "political branches" through a treaty is
not equivalent to resolution by sole executive agreement; and (2) that if indeed the complaint stated a cause of action-an issue that the court conveniently did not reach-that valid cause of action would itself be an action of
the "political branches," if one that was in potential conflict with the views
of the executive branch in this particular litigation. There may turn out to
be little conflict between executive and legislative wishes, or it may turn out
that the Constitution and/or historical practice resolve a conflict in favor of

298. Scholars have neglected this conflict, and many iterations of the doctrine mask it. See, e.g., Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch.").
299. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F Supp. 2d at372. The Second Circuit mentioned the Statements of Interest
in the context of a motion for voluntary dismissal made by plaintiffs who wanted to present their claims
to the Foundation. See In re Austrian & German Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d at 159. The opinion suggests
that the Statements raise political question doctrine issues, but it is unclear to what extent the opinion's
holding (that the district court judge had exceeded her authority with parts of the order dismissing the
case) relied upon the Statements of Interest or the political question doctrine. Id. at 163-65.
300. See GERmAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
301. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
302. Id. at 382.
303. Id. at 381-83.
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the Executive. 30 4 Courts should, however, identify separation of powers issues and look to constitutional text and historical practice for assistance in
sorting them out. With this framework in place, the court would have made
30 5
much better sense of the Nazi Era Cases.
Instead, the court saw refusing to honor the Statement of Interest as "in
effect say[ing) that the [German] Foundation and all of the treaties that have
gone before are inadequate, and that this Court could somehow do a better
job of fashioning relief for the victims of the Nazi era." 30 6 This spin neglects
the fact that if Congress or the states have already created a cause of action
30 7
that applies, then they believe that the courts can resolve such disputes. If
the President and the Senate wanted to create the German Foundation and
nullify the claims by treaty, they could. In a sense, the court's statement is
deeply distrustful of the way the Constitution allocates authority: either existing treaties preclude the claims or they do not. If they do, dismissal is
warranted. If they do not, then a cause of action has been created through
the appropriate constitutional mechanism; whether the treaty is "inadequate" is another matter. Indeed, the court's reasoning creates a treaty "penumbra": issues "like" those resolved by treaties are "meant" to be resolved
through the "political branches." 30 8 The constitutional allocation of author-

304. l am not arguing that dismissing a case that states a cause of action undermines the "rule of law"
or violates a "duty" of the judiciary to hear cases. Instead, I assume that the courts have no such "duty" to
hear cases, and suggest that whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim is highly relevant to the issue of
whether the court ought to defer to the executive branch's suggestion of dismissal. If there is no cause of
action, then there is no conflict. If there is a cause of action, on the other hand, there may be a conflict (of
lesser or greater magnitude) between the direction provided to the courts by Congress and by the Executive. Resolution of such conflict may depend upon a variety of factors (including the textual commitment
by constitution of relevant powers to each branch), as argued in the balance of this Article, but identifying such conflict is surely the first step in the analysis.
305. Frumkin argued, for example, that his claim was different from those addressed in the reparations agreements because he brought it against private companies, not governments. The court reasoned
that after the establishment of the foundation this is an "irrelevant distinction." Nazi Era Cases, 129 F.
Supp. 2d at 377.
306. Id. at 383.
307. How explicitly the cause of action applies to the case may be relevant in this analysis. Holocaustspecfic legislation creates a greater conflict than a tort action that may reach the same conduct. Even in
the tort action, however, if the court concludes that the complaint states a claim, then there is a conflict.
Resolution in favor of the Executive on the grounds that many treaties might have-but did notnullify the claims makes little sense.
308. Two other district courts have also created a treaty "penumbra." In the case of In re World War II
Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001), the court concluded that
the Peace Treaty with Japan does not preempt forced labor claims by Chinese and Korean nationals,
although that treaty does preempt such claims by U.S. plaintiffs. This "paradox"-that claims of American veterans were preempted while identical claims by non-Americans might be litigated in the U.S.helped convince the court that the California statute permitting forced labor claims was an unconstitutional violation of the federal government's foreign affairs power. Id. at 1165-66, 1168. The court's approach thus gave the treaty a penumbral effect beyond its text and formal preemption. A district court in
Washington, D.C., used comparable reasoning in another "comfort women" case, this one directed at
Japan itself. Hwang v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64-67 (D.D.C. 2001). The court reasoned:
Although as plaintiffs argue the claims of the 'comfort women' might not have been specifically
mentioned in these treaties, the series of treaties signed after the war was clearly aimed at resolving
all war claims against Japan.
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ity means little if courts conclude that because treaties resolved issues like
these, it is just as if the treaty actually resolved them.
The "national embarrassment" point (the sixth Baker factor) suffers from
similar flaws. In dismissing the case, the court concluded that both industry
and litigants had relied on the existence of an alternative forum to litigation, 30 9 without considering, however, that a treaty could still be negotiated,
signed, and ratified after any decision refusing to dismiss the case. All of the
arguments directed at the court by the U.S. government's Statement of Interest about the merits of the German Foundation, which the court ironically reasoned were not for it to consider, could then be directed to the Senate which, as the court acknowledges, is far better capable of evaluating the
merits of various reparations schemes. 310 Instead, the court's reasoning permits the executive branch to shoehorn uncertainty into deference, and then
(potentially) deference into precedent and reliance, as the embarrassment
point will work with greater force in the future, once precedent exists to
support the government's use of Statements of Interest pursuant to executive
agreements.
The Iwanowa court also used the political question doctrine to dismiss
World War Il-related litigation against private companies that included
forced labor claims, but unlike in Nazi Era Cases, it did so without the
benefit of Statements of Interest from the executive branch and before the
conclusion of the executive agreements. 31' The court reasoned that it lacked
judicially manageable standards to resolve the case (the fourth Baker factor)
because of the difficulties in sorting out all of the treaties that might apply
to plaintiffs of different nationalities, because sources of evidence were scattered all over the world, and because the claims arose out of a war that took
place more than fifty years ago. 312 The court did not consider, however, that:
(1) through statutes of limitation, legislatures routinely make decisions
about the appropriate length of time between the original injury and the
suit; and (2) Congress not only created, but also recently expanded the Alien
There is no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to
reopen those discussions nearly a half century later. Just as the agreements and treaties made with
Japan after World War II were negotiated at the government-to-government level, so too should
the current claims of the 'comfort women' be addressed directly between governments.
Id. at 67. Here again the treaty is given a penumbral power and the "government" is conflated with the
"executive branch."
309. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
310. Id.
311. Iwanowa, 67 F Supp. 2d at 424. The court in Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG concluded that the
1954 Transition Agreement (concluded by the United States as a treaty) "subsumed" private forced labor
claims. 65 F Supp. 2d 248, 278 (D.N.J. 1999). To the extent the court held that the claims in question
were barred by a treaty, this article is not directed to the decision; extinguishing state law causes of action
through a treaty is perfectly consistent with the Supremacy Clause.
312. Iwanowa, 67 F Supp. 2d at 489. The court also reasoned that the Constitution relegated these
issues to the "political branches," noting in support that reparations are often resolved by treaty. Id. at
485. This reasoning would support a refusal by the court to create a cause of action, or reasoning that
U.S. laws did nor intend to reach this conduct, but it provides no support for dismissing otherwise valid
causes of action created by the political branches. Id. at 485-87.
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Tort Statute, which provides for suits by foreign plaintiffs. 313 In other words,
if the case stated a claim, there is every reason to believe that Congress (or
state legislatures) considered these very issues, and concluded nonetheless
that this case belonged in the courts. Ironically, this holding was not even
necessary: the court had already concluded that the statute of limitations had
run on the state and foreign law claims, 314 and relied on the political question doctrine as an alternative basis for dismissal. Thus, there was no need
for the political question doctrine because Congress (or the state legislatures)
had already reached the same conclusion that the court sought: that the conduct in question happened too long ago. Had the limitations period not run
(pressing into service the court's alternative argument), the cases would be
presumed timely by Congress or the state legislatures. It would thus be hard
to couch the court's refusal to resolve the case on statute of limitations
grounds as a bow to the "political branches."
B. InternationalComity
International comity is another potential tool for evaluating Statements of
Interest requesting the dismissal of private claims. The leading case on international comity defines it as the "recognition" that one nation provides to
the "legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." 31 5
More recently, the D.C. Circuit described international comity as "the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum." 316 The Supreme Court has
applied the international comity doctrine to determine when U.S. courts
should honor judgments of foreign courts 317 and to determine when U.S.
318
law should be applied extraterritorially.
In Iwanowa the court invoked the doctrine of international comity on the
basis of two documents: a letter from a German official to the German
Chancellor stating that under international law the term "reparations" includes claims by injured individuals, and a German government report concluding that under international and German law, forced labor claims can
only be pursued by way of governmental agreements. 31 9 These documents

313. See discussion supra Part 111.7. Iwanowa's claims were based in part on the Alien Tort Statute. 67
E Supp. 2d at 438-39.
314. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 472-82. The court also concluded that some, but not all, of the Alien
Tort Statute claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
315. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
316. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
317. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 143 (considering the effect that U.S. courts should give a French judgment).
318. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (considering whether the Sherman Act
applies to conduct that took place in London).
319. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
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320
arguably could be relevant to: (1) interpreting German-U.S. agreements;
321
(2) determining the content of German law; or (3) determining the proper
extraterritorial application of U.S. law (i.e., whether the Alien Tort Statute
or the restitution and other state law claims should be applied to include the
conduct alleged by Iwanowa). 322 However, the court did not use these selfserving statements of the German government as tools for interpreting
German law, U.S. treaty obligations, or the reach of domestic laws. Nor did
it rely on executive acts-like confiscatory decrees in some countries-that
have legislative force within Germany. 323 Instead, the court used the internal
statements of the German government-not even specifically referring to
this litigation-to provide an independent basis for outright dismissal of litigation that was otherwise cognizable in U.S. courts. The cases cited by the
court in support of its ruling involve deference to judgments or proceedings of
foreign courts;324 Iwanowa fails to explain why this well-developed body of law
(similar to the domestic doctrine of res judicata) 325 should be expanded to
give domestic force to internal statements of the German government. Indeed, it is a breathtaking proposition that U.S. courts can dismiss domestic
litigation of state and federal causes of action based upon the foreign government's internal view of German and international law. The separation of
powers issue is clear: the court concluded that the pronouncements of the
German executive branch provided the basis for dismissal, even if U.S. domestic law provided a cause of action. The federalism issue is likewise clear: the
federal court, based upon the pronouncements of the German executive
326
branch, refused to enforce a state law cause of action.

320. See generally Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 261, at 1007-15.
321. See, e.g., Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 ER.D. 24 (D. Mass. 1993).
322. For example, the court could have concluded that applying these causes of action would violate
international law and thus declined to read state and federal law to encompass them. SeeMurray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (reasoning that "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains ....").
It is
unclear whether this rule of construction does or should apply to state law. SeeMichael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity," 83 IowA L. REv. 893, 947-48 (1998).
323. See Ramsey, supra note 322, at 937. Ramsey notes that it is "difficult to discern" what is intended
by "executive acts" that are purportedly entitled to comity. Executive acts with legislative force should be
treated like foreign legislative acts, but these executive acts do not have legislative force in Germany. He
also notes that executive acts might be relevant in assessing the importance of a foreign state's interest
when the court must decide whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially. Id.But this was not how
Iwanowa used the German executive statements; it used them as a basis for a flat out dismissal of domestic litigation, separate from any choice of law issues. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 489-91.
324. The only Supreme Court case that Iwanowa cites is Hilton. It also cites lower court cases that consider the deference that U.S. courts should give judgments orproceedings of foreign courts. See,e.g., United
States ex rel.
Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165 (3d Cit. 1997); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear
de Mexico, 44 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1994); Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GMBH, 25 E3d
1512 (lth Cir. 1994); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cit. 1991); Samportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cit. 1971).
325. SeeRamsey, supra note 322, at 897-99.
326. The concern here is not with the outcome. The court might have concluded (and, as to some
causes of actions, did conclude) that the case was barred by a treaty or by the statute of limitations, or
that it simply failed to state a claim. The problem is that to the extent the court relied on the international comity doctrine, it created a significant separation of powers and federalism issue that went en-
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The Nazi Era Cases court, on the other hand, was presented with a Statement of Interest by the State Department recommending dismissal in the
foreign policy interests of the United States. By the time the district court
decided the case, the German Foundation had been established. 327 Thus, the
court could have viewed this as an issue of whether it should apply California law extraterritorially (to the events that happened in Europe during the
war), or whether it should decline to apply California law in favor of the legislation establishing the German Foundation. Indeed, the court describes
part of the comity issue before it as "whether the Court should defer judg328
ment in this case, to lend effect to the laws of a foreign state."
The problem with the court's use of comity is that it completely misses
important separation of powers and federalism issues. First, the court divorces questions about the extraterritorial application of domestic law from
legislative intent. That is, in dismissing the case, the court might have concluded that state and federal law was not intended to reach foreign conduct
governed by the German Foundation. 329 Here, however, that conclusion
would have been entirely implausible, at least to the extent that Frumkin
relied on the California statute that explicitly created a cause of action based
on Nazi slave and forced labor and extended the limitations period for such
claims until December 31, 2010.330
The Nazi Era Cases opinion relies upon Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California331 for its application of the international comity doctrine but misses
part of the significance of that case. In HartfordFire Insurance, there was disagreement about the role that international comity should play in the decision to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially. 332 The dissent argued that
comity is a tool for understanding legislative intent, and concluded that in
light of international law, Congress would not have intended for the
Sherman Act to reach the extraterritorial conduct at issue. 333 Under this
analysis, the Nazi Era Cases court's use of comity appears to fail, at least with
respect to state law, because the intent of the California legislature appears
tirely unrecognized. Ramsey has identified this problem in other contexts and convincingly argued that
the international comity doctrine actually includes what should be several distinct issues, and that the
term obfuscates federalism issues. Id. at 946-51.
327. See Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 503, 503 (2002).
328. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F Supp. 2d at 387.
329. See Ramsey, supra note 322, at 906 (arguing that "legislative comity" may mean that an "apparently applicable U.S. law should not govern particular conduct because that conduct is more properly the
concern of a foreign nation").
330. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999); Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 373 n.5. A federal
district court has since held the statute unconstitutional because it encroached upon the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F
Supp. 2d at 1160. The Nazi Era Cases court considered a case filed in state court but removed based on
diversity and because it raised questions of international law. 129 F. Supp. 2d at 372-73. The court did
not consider the extent to which any of the laws in question were intended to apply extraterritorially.
331. 509 U.S. at 764.
332. Id. at 797-98.
333. Id. at 817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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clear and because the court reached no conclusion with respect to international law.
The majority opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance considered, but explicitly
refused to decide, whether or not the federal courts could decline to exercise
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct based upon principles of international comity.33 4 The court did not reach this issue because it concluded
that international comity did not apply. 335 Nazi Era Cases, on the other
hand, failed even to consider this issue and concluded that it could dismiss
under international comity otherwise cognizable state law claims on the basis of an executive branch request to dismiss the litigation in favor of the
German Foundation.
The federalism question is plain: can the President preempt state law that
is inconsistent with executive foreign policy objectives by relying on international comity, even where the President lacks the plenary power to do so?
The Nazi Era Cases court, however, missed the issue entirely. Thus the court
rendered the international comity doctrine susceptible to the sort of "mischief' that Ramsey has noted elsewhere-namely, the use of "that imprecise
and misunderstood term which allowed the court to reach a conclusion that,
if asserted directly, would be a substantial and controversial expansion of
executive power. "

336

As set out in detail at the beginning of this Article, the executive branch
lacks the authority to order this litigation dismissed: for courts to accept
this power would expand executive authority, creating tension with the Supremacy Clause. Yet through the comity doctrine, the issue of state-federal
power is completely obfuscated. As Ramsey notes, "[flogging the matter
with the invocation of 'international comity' finesses the appropriate discussion of presidential power, and allows the matter to be seen solely as a mat' 337
ter of reasonable judicial administration."
C. FunctionalConsiderations
One might argue that the courts' responses to the Statements of Interest
are best understood-and perhaps justified-in functional terms. That is,

334. Id. at 798.
335. After noting Congress's silence on the issue, the Court concluded that, in any event, "international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here." Id.
336. Ramsey, supra note 322, at 945. The opinion does mention Pink in a footnote, but only to question the constitutionality of the California statute itself. Nazi Era Cases, 129 E Supp. 2d at 386 n.26. A
holding by the court that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the California statute was unconstitutional would be extremely hard to justify on the basis of Pink, but an explicit analysis of executive
authority over international claims--even if reaching a questionable outcome-would have been far
superior to the analysis the court did provide, which gave virtually no hint of the constitutional issues
raised in the case.
337. Ramsey, supra note 322, at 945-46. As Ramsey notes, "if the President issued an executive order,
pursuant only to inherent authority, that a certain state law should not be enforced because it undermined an 'executive policy,' that would be a controversial assertation of executive power." Id. at 945. Yet
stripped of the label "international comity," this is exactly what the Nazi Era Cases permits.
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deference is justified based on political exigencies such as the threat of international conflict and the political damage to the United States that could
result from the courts' refusal to bow to the agreements negotiated by the
338
State Department.
The risk of conflict and embarrassment that might result from the courts'
refusal to defer to the executive branch fails, however, to provide a convincing rationale for deference in these cases. First, the Baker v. Carr339 factors
include "embarrassment," and, as discussed above, the potential for embarrassment here results not from the factual situation confronted by the State
Department, but from the State Department's own decision to resolve this
issue through non-treaty means. Second, as other scholars have detailed,
post-Cold War foreign policy lacks at least some of the high-stakes risks of
the past, which weakens, at least as a general matter, the support that this
rationale provides for judicial deference to the executive branch. 340 Third,
and related to the first two points, this matter presented no true national
emergency or foreign policy crisis that threatened to push the United States
into or towards armed conflict. Whatever force the deference argument
might have in a high-stakes situation, the facts in these cases do not support
its application. Indeed, the State Department's request for deference is based
in large part on concern about the plaintiffs, including their age and the
weaknesses in their legal claims, as well as the justice and fairness of the
German Foundation itself.341 True foreign policy concerns play a surprisingly limited role in the Statements of Interest, which do little beyond mentioning the importance of Germany as an ally and economic partner, and the
342
general interest in good relations with Israel and other nations.
Fourth, using embarrassment as a key inquiry (outside of truly exceptional cases) puts courts in the difficult position of either invariably relying
on deference to the executive branch-despite the strength of the textual
and historical arguments in opposition--or of using its own calculus to
weigh the risk of foreign policy embarrassment. Finally, functional constraints should explain why the Constitution's normal allocation of authority
does not apply-why these agreements are better concluded as executive
agreements rather than treaties. In some situations one might argue, for example, that time constraints prevent the presentation of the agreement to
the Senate. The functional arguments advanced in this context, on the other
hand, explain why the agreements are a good idea, but they do not explain
338. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 34 (explaining, but not defending, the rise in executive agreements and
deference to the executive branch as a result of Cold War urgency in the area of foreign affairs); Peter J.
Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 653 (2002) (arguing that
the political question doctrine once had a functional basis in the historically high stakes of international
conflict where states are assumed to be unitary actors, and the need for unquestioned secrecy is present,
but that these underpinnings have been eroded by globalization).
339. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
340. See Paul, supra note 34, at 766-68; Spiro, supra note 338, at 659-67.
341. See GERMAN AGREEMENT, supra note 2, annex B (quoted in full supra note 63).
342. Id. annex B.4.
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why the Senate is not the appropriate body to consider the virtues of the
343
agreements.
VI. A BETTER

APPROACH

This Article has described three principal problems with the deference to
the Statements of Interest filed pursuant to the recent executive agreements.
First, as Part II described, the use of sole executive agreements stands in
considerable tension with the Supremacy and Treaty Clauses. Second, as Part
III described, executive practice provides one benchmark of constitutionality, meaning that the deference afforded to these agreements sets constitutionally significant precedent for future agreements. This precedential effect
is confirmed by the discussion in Part V of the political question doctrineissues of respect and embarrassment will weigh more heavily on future
courts considering such executive agreements because the executive branch
will come to expect such deference when negotiating these agreements.
Third, the doctrinal tools used by the courts fail to account for any of these
issues, a problem compounded by the rise in litigation with foreign affairs
implications. Deferring to the Statements of Interest based on flimsy and
incoherent doctrine bodes poorly for courts' ability to chart successfully a
course through the difficult constitutional issues raised by domestic litigation with foreign affairs implications.
A better approach would do the following. First, courts applying international comity and political question doctrines to dismiss litigation in favor
of the executive branch should frame, their analyses in the text of the Constitution. If the Constitution provides an explicit source of executive authority
over the issue, courts should defer. In Nazi Era Cases, which considered a
Statement of Interest filed pursuant to the German Agreement, 344 this ap343. One might also use these functional arguments to explain the executive branch's historic control
over litigation against foreign sovereigns and why such control need not extend to cases against private
parties. As Spiro has noted, courts have shown "a demonstrably greater willingness to entertain foreign
relations matters that do not directly implicate other countries." Spiro, supra note 338, at 680. Before
globalization, Spiro argues, foreign countries did not distinguish between the actions of courts and those
of the state itself; courts' decisions thus could create significant foreign policy risks, particularly given the
high stakes of armed conflict. Id. at 667-71, 680. Litigation against foreign states implicates, by
definition, the interests of other countries while litigation against private parties may or may not do so.
Thus, litigation against foreign sovereigns potentially raises the pre-globalization risks identified by
Spiro. Interestingly, however, this functional analysis does not provide a complete historical picture of
these cases: early cases raising questions of foreign sovereign immunity were decided by courts applying
international law. See G. Edward White, The Transformationof the ConstitutionalRegime of Foreign Relations,
85 VA. L. REv. 1, 27-28, 134 (1999). Moreover, the executive supported adoption of the FSIA in 1976 in
part because judicial (as opposed to executive) resolution of sovereign immunity issues would conform to
the practice of other countries. See Chas. T. Main Int'l Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 E2d
800, 813 n.22 (1st Cit. 1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606). Thus, even though they directly implicated the interests of foreign sovereigns, such questions were resolved by courts, suggesting that either foreign governments were able to
disaggregate constituent actors within nation states or that these cases directly involving foreign sovereigns created no significant foreign policy risks.
344. Nazi EraCases, 129 E Supp. 2d 370; 372 (D.N.J. 2001).
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proach would alert courts to the Treaty and Supremacy Clause problems created by deference to such sole executive agreements. In Iwanowa, which involved neither an executive agreement nor a request for deference by the
State Department, but where the court nonetheless dismissed the litigation
based on prior government-to-government negotiations and informal statements by the U.S. Department of State, 345 this approach would have alerted
the court to Supremacy Clause issues raised by dismissal. If the Constitution
provides no clear answers, the courts should then look to executive practice.
A history of sole executive agreements that terminated private claims would
have provided some historical basis for executive authority in Nazi Era Cases.
This historical basis, in turn, could answer the tension created between sole
346
executive action and the Supremacy Clause, as it did in Dames & Moore.
Instead, however, both courts relied on a history almost entirely of treaties to
support sole executive authority. Finally, where courts consider dismissing
litigation in spite of the tension between executive authority and the Supremacy Clause, they should look for conflict on the matter between the
executive and legislative branches. Where it exists, they should be more reluctant to defer. Why? Much deference to the Executive sits in tension with
the Supremacy Clause (as described below), but there is little room to argue
that courts should never defer. In addition to considering the textual basis
for executive authority, the courts should also consider the posture of the
legislative branches with respect to the issue. This approach informally preserves the balance of power created by the Constitution by taking agreement
of the executive and legislative branch to trump inconsistent state law under
the Supremacy Clause. This approach would also resolve the three principal
problems posed by the Statements of Interest. Courts would be forced to
ground themselves in the text of the Constitution, to consider significant
changes in practice, and to seek to resolve the tension between deference and
the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses.
Courts should focus first on the constitutional text and actors. In the
forced labor cases, 347 the key question was what deference the courts should
afford the executive branch. The issue is similar to the one presented by
Dames & Moore,348 Pink,349 Belmont, 350 and Youngstown, 351 all of which involved assertions of authority by the President over private property and
private causes of action in U.S. courts. 352 The issue also arises in cases that
345. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,487 (D.N.J. 1999).
346. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
347. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 370; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 424. In Iwanowa, the court
dismissed the litigation under the political question doctrine in part because of informal executive branch
statements that reparations should be determined on a governmental level. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
348. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
349. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
350. United States v. Belmont, 301U.S. 324 (1937).
351. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
352. Hence the confusion as to why cases like Dames & Moore did not involve "political questions." See
supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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do not directly involve the U.S. government, such as private litigation 353
involving issues of foreign state succession, 354 the duration of hostilities, 355
territorial sovereignty of foreign governments, 356 diplomatic immunity,357
and head of state immunity. 358 Courts have labeled some of these, but not
others, "political questions," but all constitute domestic "lawmaking" by the
President, 359 all involve one kind of deference or another to the executive
353. Here and in the paragraphs that follow I use "private litigation" to mean litigation that does not
directly challenge the constitutionality of (U.S.) governmental (state or federal) action. Thus a case
against a foreign government would qualify as private here, because such a case is not a direct challenge
to U.S. governmental action.
354. See 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo., 218 F.3d 152,
160 (2d Cit. 2000) (holding issue of succession of foreign governments a nonjusticiable political question).
355. See, e.g., Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1872) (holding in diversity cases that where
statute of limitations did not run in Kansas during the Civil War, executive branch actions would determine duration of hostilities for purposes of limitation period). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214
(1962) (characterizing as political questions the duration of hostilities, "even in private litigation").
356. See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
357. Consistent with my argument here, Ramsey views diplomatic immunity to state law claims as
potentially raising Supremacy Clause issues. See Michael Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive
FederalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555, 566-70 (2002). To some extent, diplomatic immunity is governed
by federal statute, raising no obvious Supremacy Clause issues. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 254d (2002). See also
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 545 A.2d 1036 (Conn. 1988). Although Ramsey treats diplomatic immunity as
governed by international law, it is also a function of federal executive authority. For instance, state courts
view immunity defenses to state law causes of action as governed, at least in part, by the actions of the
federal executive branch. See, e.g., Traore v. State, 431 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1981) (reasoning that "the State
Department's determination that from June 16, 1976, to December 29, 1978, the defendant Traore's
status entitled him to immunity from criminal and civil liability should be respected by the judiciary,"
and that "if the State Department had made a contrary determination, such determination would ordinarily be deemed conclusive," but also refusing to defer to the State Department's interpretation of a
federal statute); Bolkiah v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 549 n.6 (1999) (reasoning that "only
individuals whom the United States recognizes as legitimate heads of state qualify" for immunity, and
that "the determination whether an individual qualifies as a head of state is the exclusive function of the
executive branch, to which the court must defer"). This deference to the Executive may or may not be
correct-that determination should rest on the text of the Constitution and historical practice-but the
point is that it has the same potential to undermine the Supremacy Clause as if state courts applied international law as controlling federal law (rather than choosing to incorporate or apply international law as a
matter of state law, which would, of course, raise no Supremacy Clause issues).
358. Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania AI-Abdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing state and federal claims against the Queen of Jordan on the basis of "the
Executive Branch's determination that Queen Rania is a head of state who should be immune from suit
in courts of the United States," and concluding that "[such an Executive Branch decision is entitled to
conclusive deference from the courts"). State courts also view themselves as bound by executive branch
suggestions of immunity under Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). See, e.g., Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 581 N.YS. 2d 776 (N.Y App. Div. 1992) (holding head of state entitled to immunity in
matrimonial suit on basis of suggestion of immunity by executive branch); Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.YS.
2d 303, 305 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1988) (accepting as binding State Department suggestion of immunity for
the wife of the President of Mexico).
359. Henkin lists as examples of "Presidential 'Law-Making' executive agreements and treaties that
become the law of the land, the domestic effect of termination of international agreements, the domestic
effect of the President's decision to recognize (or not) foreign states and governments, the President's
decisions about diplomatic and sovereign immunity, and other acts by the President with "domestic legal
consequences." HENKIN, supra note 80, at 54-56. As I am using the term, it does not include direct
constitutional challenges to presidential actions that would otherwise have no impact on domestic litigation, such as the challenge to the President's termination of a treaty with Taiwan brought in Goldwaterv.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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branch, 360 and all raise Supremacy Clause issues when used to preempt state
law causes of action. The focus in these cases-as well as in international
comity cases where deference to the executive branch is suggested-should
be on the source and scope of executive authority with respect to domestic
courts, particularly in light of the Supremacy Clause, and the ways in which
the Constitution provides for lawmaking. Courts should focus first on constitutional text, and consult the historical practice of both branches when
the text provides no clear answers to the question of law-making authority.
This approach recognizes that many long-standing areas of executive authority have no obvious textual antecedent, 361 and that in such areas the courts
have no monopoly on constitutional interpretation, either as a normative or
descriptive matter. 362
Forcing the courts to consider potential political questions in terms of the
constitutional sources of, and limitations on, executive authority may seem
mundane. Moreover, one might argue that the political question doctrine
does not apply to cases involving individual rights and liberties, 363 and in
any event that this doctrinal distinction has more power than a simple bid
to return to constitutional text. Yet attempting to fix the political question
doctrine in these cases through the overlay of another set of categories with
fuzzy edges ought to be resisted. Distinguishing between cases raising separation of powers and federalism concerns and those involving "individual
liberties" is not always easy. 36 More importantly, focusing on this distinc-

360. Sometimes the executive branch specifically requests application of the political question doctrine-or other deference-based doctrines-through a Statement of Interest or Suggestion of Immunity,
and the courts honor that request. See, e.g., Leutuyler, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 280. Other times the courts
follow the executive branch's determination that the case does not involve a political question. See, e.g.,
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1996). Courts also apply the political question doctrine and
leave the issue to executive branch determination even over State Department objection. See,e.g., Belgrade v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F Supp. 2d 407, 415-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In still other instances,
courts make the determination without a specific recommendation or request from the State Department.
See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424. By "deference" I do not mean just deference to the precise request
of the executive branch in pending litigation; instead, I mean the court's decision that the issue lies
within the control of the executive branch to decide, even if that branch would prefer the courts to resolve it in that particular case.
361. Congressional-executive and sole executive agreements provide obvious examples. See supra Part
II.
362. See Barkow, supra note 297, at 323-36 (arguing for greater deference by the courts to the political branches' constitutional determinations in foreign affairs and other areas); Spiro, supra note 34, at
973-81, 1009-10 (explaining the problems with a purely text-based approach to non-treaty agreements);
Yoo, supra note 21, at 799 ("practice is of particular importance in foreign affairs law. Due to the lack of
authoritative judicial precedent, many of the issues involving the Constitution and international relations
do not have clear answers. In such circumstances, the executive and legislative branches often have taken
the lead in interpreting the Constitution, and this practice can provide us with guidance as to a realistic,
workable construction of its terms.").
363. See, e.g., 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 278, at § 3534.2 (speculating that Dames & Moore did
not mention the political question doctrine because the case involved private property rights). See generally Barkow, supra note 297, at 250, 325-27 (discussing the political question doctrine and individual
liberties).
364. See Barkow, supra note 297, at 326 & n.545 (listing sources that discuss the distinction between
questions that "directly implicate individual liberties" and those "concerning the operation of govern-
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tion would hide the real concerns involved in the forced labor cases: the constitutional basis for executive authority and the Treaty and Supremacy
Clauses. Cases that directly challenge state or federal laws, or that challenge
executive branch conduct with no domestic implications, pose different con365
stitutional questions.
In considering the deference appropriate to the executive branch, courts
should consider the extent of conflict between state and federal lawmakers
and the practice of the executive branch. 366 In other words, there are four
constitutional actors involved in these cases: the executive branch, Congress,
state lawmakers, and federal judges. Looking at the degree of conflict between state and federal lawmakers on the one hand, and the executive
branch on the other, acknowledges that practice plays an important role in
mapping these boundaries, and the courts ought to consider more carefully
how they mediate and direct such practice. 367 Highlighting both horizontal
and vertical disagreement may provide better opportunity for correction and
368
ongoing dialogue among Congress, state courts, and the executive branch.
Instead, the forced labor decisions overlooked the potential tension between
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, as well as

ment").
365. Specifically, direct challenges to state or federal laws do not have the same hidden Supremacy
Clause issues that are raised by the private litigation in question, nor do cases in which the lawmaking by
the executive branch is not asserted as authority in domestic litigation, as for example, in Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), where members of Congress sued the President over his termination of a
mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
366. This is similar to some aspects of the "constitutional increments" theory articulated by Spiro, supra note 34, at 1009-34. His approach provides that historical practices "have the force of constitutional
law," id. at 1010, and evaluates such practices based on their acceptance, "contestedness," age, and pedigree, id. at 1013-16. The approach outlined here is similar not only in its acceptance of the place of
historical practice in constitutional interpretation in the area of foreign affairs, but also in some of the
ways in which it analyzes such practice. For example, addressing the extent of conflict between lawmakers and the executive branch is one way of asking, as Spiro does, how "accepted" the practice is. Id. at
1013. Here, the focus is on the conflict between specific constitutional actors. Professor Spiro also bases
constitutional legitimacy on contestedness; the more contested, the stronger the norm that emerges. Id.
at 1014. Here, the focus is on how courts promote contestedness; that is, I argue that courts should identify 'potential and actual conflict between the executive branch and lawmakers, and the constitutional
problems that such conflict raises. Thus courts act to strengthen the norms that emerge, rather than
avoiding potential conflicts and weakening such norms.
367. This approach appears to have some similarity to Tribe's argument that the constitutionality of
executive agreements depends in part on the degree to which they "have a direct impact on matters normally regulated by state and federal legislative processes." Tribe, supra note 34, at 1267 (quoting a letter
from Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter to Senator Earnest Hollings). But Tribe does not develop this argument, and he would likely disagree with the emphasis here on historical practice and changes in the
constitutional allocation of authority. See id. at 1278, 1280-81 (arguing that "even if the constitutional
text were truly ambiguous, one should not view such ambiguity as license immediately to leap outside
the discourse of text and structure," and that history is rarely persuasive in constitutional interpretation
unless it extends back to the founding).
368. Seegenerally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing the advantages of judges highlighting their disagreement with
Congress on constitutional issues, including the possibility that this practice would enhance dialogue
between Congress and the judiciary); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV.
789, 822-35 (2002) (describing the costs associated with legal uncertainty).
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the tension between state and federal governments. This problem is generated by the doctrines themselves; most iterations of the political question
doctrine speak in terms of the "political branches," neglecting to consider
that they are not a monolith. Focusing on how the Constitution allocates
law-making authority and on the Supremacy Clause should help courts do a
better job of disaggregating the "political branches" and pinpointing exactly
369
to whom they should defer.
This approach creates explicit links between executive branch "lawmaking" authority, the Supremacy Clause, and questions of deference to the
executive branch. Deference to the executive branch can, as we have seen
throughout this Article, undermine the law-making system devised by the
Constitution, but there is no serious argument that the Constitution somehow forbids all such deference. 370 This tension is best resolved by justifying

369. Recent Supreme Court cases provide some support for this analysis by favoring formal lawmaking rather than deference to the executive branch. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994), the Court refused to strike down a California tax statute despite executive
branch filings, briefs, and statements urging the court to do so in the foreign policy interests of the
United States. Id. at 324-30. The opinion considers the textual commitment to Congress of the power to
regulate foreign commerce, notes Congress's explicit consideration and rejection of a variety of bills that
would have preempted California's law, and refuses to defer to the executive branch. Id. at 325-30. Although specifically refusing to address displacement of state law by executive agreement, id. at 329, the
Court's attention to the constitutional allocation of authority and its refusal to permit deference to the
executive branch to replace Congress's role in lawmaking, suggest that courts should scrutinize carefully
the request for deference that would permit the executive branch to avoid the Treaty power and the Supremacy Clauses.
Similarly, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000), the Court held that a
state statute restricting the Massachusetts government from making purchases from Burma was preempted by a federal statute. Although the district court struck down the statute, it did so under the
doctrine of the dormant foreign affairs power. Id. at 371. The First Circuit agreed and also reasoned that
federal law preempted the state law. Id. The Supreme Court agreed on the preemption point and refused
to reach the dormant foreign affairs power argument. Id. at 372-74. The Court's reading of the federal
statute allowed it to rely on preemption (and the Supremacy Clause) instead of judge-made common law,
and signaling, perhaps, a preference for foreign affairs "lawmaking" through the methods spelled out
explicitly in the Constitution, rather than through the deference of the courts.
In Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. 221, 229 (1986), unlike in Crosby and Barclays Bank, the Court explicitly
considered the political question doctrine. In that case, wildlife conservation groups filed suit to compel
the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan as engaging in fishing operations that diminished the effectiveness of international whaling quotas, thereby triggering mandatory sanctions under federal law. Id. at
227-28. Plaintiffs argued that the statute required the Secretary to certify Japan, id; the administration,
on the other hand, had negotiated an executive agreement with Japan, requiring adherence to harvest
limits in return for a promise not to certify. Id. at 228. The Japan Whaling case involved a pointed and
ongoing disagreement between Congress and the executive branch as to certification. When called upon
to interpret the statute Congress had passed in response to the executive branch refusal to impose sanctions, the Court refused to let the executive agreement with Japan transform this issue into a political
question. Id. at 229-30.
370. While recognition of foreign governments, for example, frequently has domestic legal
ramifications, the President's constitutional power to "receive ambassadors," under Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution, provides a strong textual basis for such recognition, and deference to this determination
is unproblematic. One might argue that the President may make the determination as to the status of the
foreign government, but that he should exercise no direct control over the domestic legal consequences of
recognition. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 79, at 263 n.125. This approach, however, has two
related problems: first, it fails to resolve the difficulty in distinguishing between the status determination
and its legal ramification; and second, it provides only for total deference or none at all. For example,
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deference based on the text of the Constitution, historical practice, and an
examination of the extent of conflict between state and federal lawmakers
and the executive branch. Even informal agreement among these constitutional actors helps to preserve the balance of power created by the Constitution, which requires, after all, a very high level of agreement between the
Senate and the President in order to preempt state law with a treaty, and
some agreement between the Congress and the President (or a very high
371
level of congressional support) to create "laws."
Consider the following two cases. In the first, Williams v. Suffolk Ins., a
Connecticut policyholder sued a Massachusetts insurance company for losses
arising out of the seizure and detention of a schooner in the Falkland Islands
by authorities from Buenos Aires.37 2 The case hinged upon whether the
Buenos Aires government had jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands.37 3 On
this question, the court deferred to the executive branch, reasoning that
courts should not inquire as to whether the Executive "be right or wrong,"
but that it is "enough to know, that in the exercise of [its] constitutional
functions, [the Executive] has decided the question." 374 As the second case,
consider Nazi Era Cases, in which a California resident, pursuant to California law, sued both U.S. and foreign defendants for Nazi-era atrocities. 375 The
court, as we have seen, dismissed the case in the foreign policy interests of
the United States, based upon the request of the executive branch.
The second case, as I have argued, raises important Supremacy Clause issues, while the first does not. Both, however, involve "private rights." The
stronger the textual grant of authority to the executive branch, the weaker
the Supremacy Clause problems. These cases likely could be distinguished

although access to the courts used to follow invariably from the recognition of a foreign government, the
State Department changed its recognition policy during the twentieth century and refused to recognize
an increasingly large number of governments. As a result, it began to request even that unrecognized governments have access to the courts. See Mary Beth West & Sean D. Murphy, The Impact on U.S. Litigation
of Non-Recognition of Foreign Governments, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 435, 440-60 (1990). In other words, "recognition" has no fixed meaning; to argue that the State Department has some static power to "recognize"
governments-a power the President has enjoyed since the framing-denies the change and transformation in what that term means. A successful approach to "presidential lawmaking" in foreign affairs must
provide the tools for courts to facilitate and recognize changes in practice.
371. Conceptually, this approach has some similarities to Chevron-type deference to the executive
branch. Such deference is based on a "theory of delegation" that presumes Congress has delegated "lawmaking power" to the agency (or, here, to the executive branch). Bradley, supra note 14, at 670. The
argument presented in this Article-that "political questions" and executive branch lawmaking should
be marked by a continuum of deference, and that courts should use the same tools to evaluate both-bears some similarity to Chevron deference, in that it looks to agreement (of which delegation is one type)
between lawmakers and the executive branch as one basis for deference.
372. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 414 (1839).
373. The defendant insurance company maintained that the ship's master had not acted in good faith
because the Buenos Aires authorities had outlawed the seal trade in which the ship was engaged. The
plaintiff argued that the Buenos Aires government had no jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, and that
the ship's master thus was not bound to give up the purpose of his voyage on the basis of this unauthorized threat. Id. at 420-21.
374. Id. at 420.
375. 129 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
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on this basis alone, but the degree of conflict between the state legislatures
and the executive branch is also germane to this analysis. One reason the
Supremacy Clause is less of a problem in Williams than in Nazi Era Cases is
that in Williams, the state law of insurance coverage did not explicitly attempt to answer questions about foreign territorial sovereignty. In Nazi Era
Cases, on the other hand, the state legislature could not have been clearer as
to its attempt to regulate the conduct in question. In the latter situation,
the Supremacy Clause issue is in sharp relief. Even for causes of action for
wrongful death and unjust enrichment, the level of conflict is still higher in
the forced labor cases than in the insurance coverage dispute. This is so because state laws have attempted to address the conduct in question-slave and
forced labor (if the complaint states a cause of action). 376 Insurance coverage
litigation, on the other hand, has nothing to do with foreign territorial sovereignty.37 7 This analysis also helps to clarify the constitutional basis for the
weaknesses in the courts' reasoning in the forced labor cases. Courts should,
for example, decide first whether the complaint states a cause of action,
378
thereby potentially drawing into light the views of the state legislature.
Likewise, the courts should not decide that events happened "too long ago"
as a basis for applying the political question doctrine, because state statutes
of limitations already express the legislature's view on that very question.

376. As noted above, several courts have distinguished between cases against private parties and those
against governmental actors, and between dismissing the entire suit and holding that particular issues
qualify as political questions. As Justice Frankfurter reasoned in Baker v. Carr:
Where the question arises in the course of a litigation involving primarily the adjudication of other
issues between the litigants, the Court accepts as a basis for adjudication the political departments'
decision of it. But where its determination is the sole function to be served by the exercise of the judicial power, the Court will not entertain the action.
369 U.S. 186, 282-83 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d
1328, 1332 n.3 (9th Cit. 1992) (remarking that "we have found no Supreme Court or Court of Appeals
decisions which have dismissed a suit brought against a private party on the basis of the political question doctrine"). The approach here makes clear a potential constitutional basis for these distinctions: the
extent to which a state law cause of action itself is undermined by the deference to the executive branch.
Litigation involving "primarily the adjudication of other issues" involves causes of action created for
purposes other than testing the constitutionality of governmental actions; to dismiss this litigation entirely would undermine state law. Causes of action directly challenging governmental action as inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution are not based on state law and, in any event, dismissing them does not
undermine other causes of action unrelated to governmental powers.
377. The Second Circuit's decision in 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate General of the Socialist
FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cit. 2000), provides another example. In that case, landlords sought unpaid rent from the former Yugoslavia, which no longer exists, so the landlord brought
suit against five successor states as well as other defendants. Id. at 155. The State Department filed a
Statement of Interest urging the court to dismiss the case because the executive branch had not resolved
the extent to which the new countries were liable as successors for the debts of.the former Yugoslavia. Id.
at 157. Nothing about New York property law suggests that the legislature had considered the issue of
the liability of the successor government. Moreover, decisions about succession of governments have
traditionally been within the power of the federal executive branch, and the power to receive ambassadors
provides at least an arguable textual hook for this power. International law provides no contrary rule.
378. It also potentially avoids unnecessary constitutional adjudication: if the complaint states no cause
of action, the case is over without recourse to the political question doctrine.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The executive agreements that President Clinton negotiated with France,
Germany, and Austria highlight the weak link in the constitutional balance
of powers over foreign affairs: the judiciary. Lacking the authority to terminate the litigation, the executive branch relied on the deference of the courts
to achieve the same result. However, the doctrinal tools the courts have developed for considering requests for deference-the political question doctrine and international comity--distract courts from the analysis of constitutional text and historical practice that ought to frame these requests. Pursuant to this faulty analysis, the courts have given effect to executive agreements and nullified state law causes of action, without so much as a nod to
the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses. On the other hand, scholars who describe
the separation-of-power boundaries created by these clauses do so without so
much as a nod to the political question doctrine or other theories of deference that inform the courts' approaches.
The appropriate response to the Statements of Interest made pursuant to
the executive agreements would focus first on constitutional text and historical practice. Indeed, historical practice makes constitutional sense only
when coupled with text. In concluding that the power over World War II
claims settlement rests with the "political branches," for example, the courts
drew no distinction between historical agreements concluded as treaties and
those concluded as sole executive agreements. A careful view of history coupled with the text of the Constitution would have alerted the courts that a
constitutionally significant departure from prior practice was at issue.
Viewing the "political branches" as a monolith is the second primary
problem with the political question analysis. The courts should instead consider the request for deference to the executive branch in conflicting with
the cause of action created by the legislative branch. Such conflict ought to
militate against deference.
International agreements that establish foundations in Europe for resolution of the European slave labor claims may be the best approach to compensation for legal, political, cultural, and social reasons. The question this Article has considered, however, is different: how do these international agreements become part of U.S. law and ensure the dismissal of the private state
and federal claims that prompted the agreement? Constitutional text and
history provide an easy answer: the Treaty Clause.
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